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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, two major corporate and financial crises have shaken the 
foundations of corporate governance in rapid succession. In 2001 and 2002, Enron, 
WorldCom, and several other major U.S. corporations collapsed after evidence of 
accounting fraud emerged at each company.1 By the time lawmakers and regulators had 
finished dealing with the fallout from these scandals and with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
20022 and other reforms, a new crisis emerged with the distressed sale of the largest 
subprime lender, Countrywide Financial, and the subsequent collapses of Bear Stearns, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and AIG.3 
The earlier corporate scandals were widely viewed as a failure of corporate 
governance and were centered largely in the United States.4 The 2008 crisis, however, 
was far more global in its scope and was closely tied to governance and regulation in the 
financial services industry.5 The crisis raised grave concerns about the role of derivatives 
and other new financing techniques—the so-called shadow banking system—in 21st 
century governance.6 Much as with securities analysts and auditors in the earlier crisis, 
 
 1.  The scandals of the early 21st century have been the subject of many helpful books and articles. Two 
of the best treatments from a corporate governance perspective are AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE 
LAW AND MODERNIZING SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. (John Armour & Joseph A. 
McCahery eds., 2006) [hereinafter AFTER ENRON] and JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS 
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006). For a particularly insightful analysis of the Parmalat collapse a few 
months later, see Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: 
The Parmalat Case, in AFTER ENRON, supra. 
 2.  Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). 
 3.  Accounts of these events are already legion. See, e.g., ANDREW R. SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: HOW 
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2010) 
(chronicling the collapses of, among others, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, based on extensive 
interviews with the participants). 
 4.  For an extended analysis from this perspective, see COFFEE, supra note 1. 
 5.  The emphasis on financial services is attested by the spate of recent books assessing the Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers collapses and the crisis in the financial services industry more generally. See, e.g., 
WILLIAM COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS (2009) (examining the collapse of Bear Stearns as an example of what 
went wrong on Wall Street during the 2008 financial crisis); SORKIN, supra note 3 (providing an inside look at 
the crisis in the financial services industry); DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST (2009) (analyzing the crisis in 
the financial services industry from Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s point of view). 
 6.  See, e.g., Andrew R. Sorkin, Paulson Backs Stronger Oversight of Markets, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
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the principal gatekeeper—in this case, the credit rating agencies that rated mortgage-
related securitizations and other debt instruments—proved ineffectual.7 
Even more than its predecessor, the recent crisis spurred a pervasive restructuring of 
corporate regulation. Once fully implemented, Congress’s handiwork—the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank)8—will dramatically 
rework three crucial areas: internal corporate decision making, third-party gatekeepers, 
and financial derivatives. With internal corporate governance, lawmakers focused on 
increasing minority shareholders’ ability to propose their own directorial candidates by 
authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other regulators to 
promulgate “proxy access” rules.9 The SEC quickly acted on this invitation—too quickly, 
it appears, as the SEC’s initial rule was struck down on procedural grounds.10 Dodd–
Frank homed in on third-party gatekeepers by imposing new directorial independence 
requirements on credit rating agencies and instructing regulators to remove the provisions 
in banking regulation that give pride of place to the three dominant rating agencies: 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch.11 For financial derivatives—contracts whose 
value is based on changes in interest rates, currency values, stock prices, or nearly 
anything else, or the occurrence of a specified event, such as a default on a company’s 
debt—Dodd–Frank fills an almost complete regulatory vacuum. It does so by requiring 
that most derivatives be both cleared by a clearinghouse that guarantees the performance 
of both parties, and traded on an exchange, rather than negotiated privately by the two 
parties.12 
Although the three sets of reforms seem entirely unrelated—both as initially enacted 
and as regulators have fleshed out the new regime—we argue in this Article that the 
regulation in each area embraces, wrestles with, and attempts to shape a new corporate 
governance paradigm we call “inside-out” corporate governance. This new inside-out 
governance model has profound implications for corporate regulation, as well as the 
respective roles of federal and state legislation. Much as the principal regulatory 
challenge of the 1980s and 1990s was takeovers, the central question for the current era 
will be, we believe, how to effectively manage the new inside-out paradigm. 
For much of the 20th century, corporate governance consisted of internal corporate 
governance—that is, decision making by the principal inside constituencies of the firm—
together with outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and 
markets.13 With the advent of the takeover movement, most visibly in the 1980s,14 the 
 
(May 6, 2010), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/paulson-backs-stronger-oversight-of-markets/ 
(quoting former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s testimony that derivatives “didn’t create the crisis, but they 
magnified it. They exacerbated it.”). 
 7.  See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti et al., Rating Agencies Face Curbs, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2010, at A1 
(describing criticism of crediting rating agencies’ performance during the housing boom). 
 8.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010). 
 9.  Id. § 971.  
 10.  These developments are the focus of Part II, infra. Dodd–Frank also institutes “say-on-pay,” requiring 
corporations to provide for non-binding votes on executive compensation at least once every three years. Dodd–
Frank § 951. 
 11.  See generally infra Part III (discussing third-party gatekeepers). 
 12.  See generally infra Part IV (discussing derivatives regulation). 
 13.  With “outside” factors, our particular concern is with oversight that is designed to enhance the 
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distinction between inside and outside governance began to erode. Although the “raiders” 
of the 1980s were outsiders, they relied on the internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance—such as proxy contests—when incumbent managers thwarted their bids 
with poison pills and other defenses.15 More recently, hedge funds and other “outside” 
investors have used the tools of corporate governance to seek representation on the board 
of directors or to influence corporate decision making in other ways.16 As a result of 
these developments, inside and outside governance are now intertwined in ways that echo 
the emergence of shadow banking in finance,17 and draw on many of the same 
innovations.18 
Throughout the Article, we pursue two main objectives. First, having identified the 
new inside-out governance paradigm, we show how it is reflected in the new regulatory 
landscape. Second, using inside-out governance as our lens, we assess its implications for 
proxy access, auditing and credit rating, and derivatives, and offer suggestions for further 
reform in each area. 
At several key points in the Article, we draw on new developments in Italian and 
E.U. corporate governance. Italy may seem an odd place to look for revealing insights for 
the United States. The United Kingdom is usually viewed as a more logical choice, given 
the historical links between the United States and United Kingdom and the similarities in 
their approach to corporate governance.19 In both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, corporate stockholding is far more dispersed than elsewhere in the world, and 
both countries have a comparatively market-oriented stance toward corporate 
governance.20 Not only does Italy have far fewer publicly held corporations—roughly 
300, as compared to 12,000 in the United States—but most large Italian corporations are 
 
governance of a corporation or protect investors in the firm, rather than ensure environmental compliance or 
other objectives. For a broader conception of corporate governance, see Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the 
Law of Business? Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 
109 (2004).  
 14.  There was an early takeover wave as well, dating back to the 1950s and early 1970s, but takeovers 
had their most dramatic effects in the 1980s. For a defense of the earlier takeovers, see Henry Manne, Mergers 
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).  
 15.  See, e.g., Carmody v. Toll Bros. Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (summarizing limits placed on 
the use of certain kinds of poison pill defenses). 
 16.  For evidence that this activism benefits investors, see Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008). 
 17.  One of the first articles to recognize the potential dangers of these developments was Raghuram G. 
Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?, 2005 FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY 313, 
available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2005/pdf/rajan2005.pdf (suggesting that financial 
innovations that were thought to reduce risk actually may increase the fragility of the financial system and 
magnify systemic risk). See also RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL 
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010) (further developing these arguments). 
 18.  We do not claim that other scholars have not recognized the particular developments described in the 
text. Some, such as hedge fund activism, are well known. Our contribution is, we hope, showing they fit a larger 
pattern that now permeates corporate governance. 
 19.  John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The 
Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727 (2007). Indeed, one of us has 
analyzed the treatment of a key corporate governance issue—takeovers—in the United States and United 
Kingdom, albeit in an effort to show that the two nations’ regulation of corporate governance is more divergent 
than is commonly assumed. Id.  
 20.  Id. at 1728. 
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controlled either by a family or by a corporate group.21 Unlike in the United States, 
where corporate governance experts worry primarily about the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders, the principal conflict in Italian corporations pits the 
control block against minority shareholders.22 
While the contrasts are indeed stark, they make the Italian comparison far more 
revealing for our purposes. With both minority shareholder representation and credit 
rating agencies, Italy has intervened in ways that echo proposals or actual reforms in the 
United States and which are designed to foster inside-out governance. By teasing out the 
reasons for the similarities and differences—do the divergences reflect a difference in the 
governance context, for instance, or might they offer insights of direct relevance for the 
United States?—we can offer new insights into these issues and inside-out governance 
more generally. 
The Article begins, in Part II, with the issue of proxy access and minority 
shareholder representation on the board of directors. A central theme in this Part is the 
distinction between U.S. reform, which focuses on shareholder voting power, and the 
Italian emphasis on minority shareholder representation. U.S. regulators worry more 
about the process, or “means,” whereas Italy has been more concerned with the results, or 
“ends.” We argue that the distinction can be traced to the different shareholding patterns 
in the two countries, but that the two approaches also have very different implications for 
corporate governance and raise different concerns. We also show that the SEC has 
pursued an internally incoherent (though not politically incoherent) path on proxy access. 
Although proxy access is best seen as bringing outsiders such as hedge funds more fully 
into internal corporate governance—and thus as facilitating inside-out governance—the 
rule’s prerequisites—most importantly, a three year holding requirement—make it 
difficult for outsiders like hedge funds to use. 
Part III shifts from internal governance to the third-party gatekeepers. With both of 
the key gatekeepers—auditors and credit rating agencies—inside-out governance is well-
established. Although auditors and credit rating agencies provide outside oversight, both 
are hired by the corporation itself.23 In each case, this connection has created a serious 
conflict of interest, with concerns that the gatekeeper caters to the inside decision maker 
that is paying its bills. The proposed strategies for controlling this conflict tend to fall into 
two categories, which we refer to as ex ante and ex post approaches. By ex ante, we mean 
reforms that take effect at or before the time the gatekeeper is actually engaged to 
scrutinize a company. Examples include the requirement in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act that 
a company’s auditor be selected by an independent audit committee, and more elaborate 
proposals such as a new audit insurance scheme.24 The principal ex post strategy, on the 
 
 21.  See, e.g., Marcello Bianchi et al., Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and 
Control in Italy, in THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (2001) (“The largest stake in listed and unlisted 
companies is held by other non-financial or holding companies.”). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  With auditors, this pattern goes back many decades. See infra Part III.B.1 (providing a history of the 
auditing industry in the United States). Credit rating agencies originally used an outsider model, in which 
investors paid for access to credit ratings. See infra II.B.2 (providing a history of the credit rating industry in the 
United States). The shift to an issuer pays model came more recently and was one of the first hints of the shift to 
inside-out governance. See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee 
Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1022–23 (2009). 
 24.  See infra Part III.D (discussing the problems and solutions that auditors pose for corporate 
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other hand, is litigation and the possibility of legal liability if the gatekeeper fails to 
provide adequate oversight. 
Several of the most interesting ex ante proposals would radically restructure the 
selection of these gatekeepers by, for instance, replacing the traditional auditing 
relationship with an insurance scheme. The proposals would retain the audit function’s 
inside-out quality, but would interpose an additional party, the insurance company. While 
we find these proposals alluring, we are skeptical of their efficacy, and argue for a 
different, though similarly market-oriented strategy: permitting an issuer and its auditor 
to contract over the scope of the auditor’s potential liability.25 
With credit rating agencies, Dodd–Frank imposes a panoply of internal governance 
obligations (such as independent directors) that require increased disclosure and instruct 
regulators to remove the regulatory imprimatur for credit ratings.26 These changes would 
indirectly restructure the current inside-out framework by diminishing the pressure that 
pensions and other institutional investors have to buy securities that have been rated as 
investment grade by SEC-approved rating agencies (CRAs). While we favor the removal 
of the SEC-approved credit rating agencies’ regulatory advantage, we point out that these 
CRAs are now subject to burdens that will not apply to their competitors. We also 
advocate increased use of alternative mechanisms for assessing securities.27 
Part IV focuses on derivatives regulation. With derivatives, the inside and outside 
dimensions of their use are quite separate in some respects. Internally, the directors of 
many corporations use derivatives to adjust their exposure to key risks. The directors of 
Southwest and other airlines, to provide a familiar example, use derivatives to hedge 
against increases in the price of oil.28 Derivatives also serve as an important and quite 
distinct form of outside governance. Changes in the price of a credit default swap—which 
insures against declines in the value of a company’s debt—provide crucial information 
about the company’s financial health, thus shaping investors’ willingness to invest in the 
company. 
Dodd–Frank tries to distinguish the use of derivatives for hedging (inside 
governance) from more speculative dimensions of the derivatives markets (which are 
essential to their outside role).29 The legislation is designed to exempt the kinds of 
hedging transactions that are the principal corporate governance use of derivatives from 
the most intrusive of the new regulatory requirements.30 But burdening speculation also 
imposes costs on corporate use of derivatives for hedging, since hedging and speculation 
necessarily travel together. Moreover, and more importantly, Dodd–Frank requires that a 
 
governance). 
 25.  This approach was suggested to us by CONSOB Commissioner Luca Enriques in a 2010 meeting at 
CONSOB. Meeting with CONSOB officials at CONSOB offices in Rome, Italy (Mar. 12, 2010). 
 26.  See infra Part III.G (discussing the impact of Dodd–Frank). 
 27.  See also Mark J. Flannery et al., Credit Default Swaps as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2085 (2010) (evaluating the “viability of credit default swap (CDS) spreads as a 
substitutes for credit ratings”).  
 28.  Peter Pae, Hedge on fuel prices pays off, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2008, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/30/business/fi-southwest30.  
 29.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 721, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1658–72 (2010) (excluding “positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk” from definition of 
“Major Swap Participant”).  
 30.  See infra Part IV.E (discussing the exceptions for hedging transactions).  
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hedging firm’s directors explicitly opt out of margin requirements that would otherwise 
apply. The legislation itself formally integrates derivatives into inside corporate 
governance for these firms. After exploring each of these issues through the lens of 
inside-out corporate governance, we close the Article by speculating briefly about the 
future of inside-out governance for, among other things, state regulation of corporate law. 
 
II. PROXY ACCESS AND MINORITY DIRECTORS 
A. Introduction 
The proxy process allows shareholders to vote without being present at the annual 
meeting, and thus enables modern corporations to satisfy quorum requirements despite 
their dispersed ownership structure.31 The SEC attempted to replicate the old-fashioned 
annual meeting when it adopted early proxy rules.32 The most fundamental right that 
shareholders are entitled to exercise at the annual meeting is nominating and electing 
directors.33 Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), however, 
allows management to exclude from its proxy materials a shareholder proposal that 
relates to nomination or election of the board of directors.34 This exclusion forced 
shareholders to conduct and to finance any directorial challenges by themselves.35 As a 
result, a shareholder’s ability to nominate and elect directors was impeded.36 This 
impediment, which had been debated for decades, was finally adjusted as a result of the 
new financial legislation, in ways that both acknowledge and stymie the new inside-out 
paradigm.37 
 
 31.  Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 
1134–35 (1993). 
 32.  Robert H. O’Brien, SEC Comm’r, Address Before the Conference Board (Jan. 21, 1943), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1943/012143obrien.pdf. See also Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest 
Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 438 n.88 (1971) (discussing the need for 
shareholders to have some type of participation in corporate suffrage). 
 33.  As SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro said, “[T]his [proxy access] proposal represents nearly seven years 
of debate about whether the federal proxy rules should support or stand in the way of shareholders exercising 
their fundamental right to nominate directors.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments to 
Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to Nominate Directors (May 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-116.htm. 
 34.  SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009). 
 35.  Delaware law now allows shareholder to propose bylaws that requires a company to reimburse 
shareholders who gain board representations for expenses relating to proxy contests. See infra text 
accompanying note 61 (discussing Delaware’s amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law). 
 36.  See Fisch, supra note 31, at 1165 (arguing that, although the SEC rules do not prevent a shareholder 
from nominating a candidate or slate of candidates in opposition to management’s choices, they impede the 
ability of a shareholder to do so); see also John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder 
Oversight, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1988) (arguing that three problems, including the inefficiency in the system of 
proxy vote solicitation, may discourage the use of proxy contests to challenge management and transfer 
corporate control). 
 37. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1915 (2010). 
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B. History 
Shareholder access to the proxy process relating to the nomination or election of 
directors has undergone extensive change in the past 60 years. Because there have been 
no formal legislative developments, our historical review of the shareholder proxy access 
focuses mostly on regulatory actions taken by the SEC, along with a few influential 
judicial decisions that eventually prompted regulatory proposals. Due to the surge in 
regulatory attention in the past decade, we divide the evolution of shareholder proxy 
access into pre-2003 period and post-2003 period. 
1. Pre-2003 Period 
During the period from the enactment of the Exchange Act to 2003, the SEC, on 
several occasions, considered the issue whether shareholders can use management’s 
proxy materials for the purpose of director nominations and elections, without formally 
proposing to expand shareholders’ proxy access. In 1942, the SEC directed the staff to 
review then-effective proxy rules and submit proposed changes in order to address ballot 
access for shareholder proposals, including those in connection with director elections.38 
One proposed rule would have revised the proxy rules to provide stockholders with an 
opportunity to “use the management’s proxy materials in support of their own nominees 
for directorship, as well as for the nominees of the management.”39 The SEC, however, 
did not adopt the proposed changes relating to proxy access and did not explain its 
decision.40 
In 1977, as part of a broad review of shareholder communication and participation in 
corporate governance, the SEC revisited the issue of shareholder proxy access.41 Without 
proposing rule changes, the SEC requested comments on “whether . . . shareholders 
[should] have access to management’s proxy soliciting materials for the purpose of 
nominating persons of their choice to serve on the board of directors.”42 Meanwhile, the 
SEC asked questions about the eligibility of nominating shareholders, the disclosure 
requirements, the interplay with state law, and the distinction between control and non-
control nominations.43 After holding a series of public hearings in 1997, the SEC 
proposed and adopted amendments to a number of proxy rules, none of which directly 
 
 38.  It is worth noting that the Exchange Act did not include specific rules on these proxy solicitation 
issues when it was enacted. See Fisch, supra note 31, at 1137–38 (discussing implications of the changes’ 
deference to business owners’ judgment). To address shareholders’ complaints that management’s failure to 
include shareholder proposals in the company’s proxy materials made its proxy solicitation false and 
misleading, the SEC amended proxy rules and adopted Rule 14a-8 in 1942 to require management to include in 
its proxy statement any shareholder proposal that was “a proper subject for action by the security holders.” Id. at 
1143–44. 
 39.  Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1821 and H.R. 2019 Before the 
H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. 17–19 (1943) (statement of Ganson Purcull, 
Chairman, H. Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce). 
 40.  Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,653 (Dec. 18, 1942).  
 41.  Exchange Act Release No. 34-13,482, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901 (Apr. 28, 1977). See also Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-13,901, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,860 (Aug. 29, 1977) (requesting comments from all interested persons). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id.  
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addressed the issue of shareholder proxy access.44 Among these amendments, the SEC 
required companies to state whether they had a nominating committee, and if so, whether 
the nominating committee would consider shareholder recommendations.45 A staff report 
submitted to the Senate in 1980 concluded that due to the emerging concept of 
nominating committee, the SEC should not propose and adopt a shareholder access rule 
at that time.46 The staff report did, however, suggest the possibility of taking future 
actions with respect to shareholder nominations if the nominating committee did not 
serve as a satisfactory solution to shareholder nominations.47 
In 1992, the SEC reviewed the proxy access issue in connection with an amendment 
to Exchange Act Rule 14a-4, which provides that to establish a bona fide nominee, the 
nominee must consent to being named and to serve if elected.48 The amendment sought 
to decrease “the difficulty experienced by shareholders in gaining a voice in determining 
the composition of the board of directors.”49 In this setting, the SEC declined to require 
companies to include both management nominees and shareholder nominees for 
directorship in the same universal ballot. Rather, it revised the bona fide nominee rule to 
allow shareholders to fill out a “short slate” with management nominees, in which case 
shareholders seeking board representation would still need to file separate proxy 
statements and cards.50 
2. Post-2003 Period 
Starting in 2003, at a time when the use of the proxy process by outsiders had 
become increasingly common, the SEC took a more active role on shareholder proxy 
access. This period also witnessed several seminal judicial decisions with respect to 
procedures for shareholder participation in board nomination. In April 2003, the SEC 
directed the Division of Corporate Finance to review the proxy rules and solicited public 
comments with regard to the Division’s review.51 The Division later recommended 
changes to enhance shareholder access to the proxy process relating to director 
 
 44.  Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,970, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (July 18, 1978). See also Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-15,384, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,522 (Dec. 6, 1978) (addressing amendments regarding providing 
shareholder with information). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  This conclusion is based on the work of a task force on Corporate Accountability. See DIVISION OF 
CORP. FIN., SEC, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY A60–64 (Sept. 4, 1980) (printed for the use 
of Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.) (recommending that the SEC 
not move forward on proxy access). 
 47.  Id. at A60–65, A69. 
 48.  SEC Rule 14a-4(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2009). 
 49.  Exchange Act Release No. 34-31,326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,288 (Oct. 23, 1992). 
 50.  The “short slate” rule allows shareholders who seek minority board representation to include some of 
the management’s proposed directors on their own slate. SEC Rule 14a-4(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4. Under this 
rule, the shareholders can nominate board candidates of their choice and indicate which management 
candidate(s) they oppose, to make room for the new candidates. Id. See also Governance Glossary, COUNCIL OF 
INST. INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/governanceglossary#s (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (defining the rule as 
allowing shareholders to nominate directors for a board and then indicate which nominees they will withhold 
their votes from to make room for new candidates). 
 51.  SEC Press Release No. 2003-46, Commission to Review Current Proxy Rules and Regulations to 
Improve Corporate Democracy (Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-46.htm. 
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nominations.52 In October 2003, the SEC proposed rules that would have required 
companies to include shareholder nominees in company proxy materials under certain 
circumstances, for the purpose of addressing perceived inadequacies of shareholder 
participation in the director nomination and elections.53 However, the SEC ultimately did 
not adopt the proposed rule. 
In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in AFSCME v. AIG that a 
shareholder proposal that sought to amend the corporate bylaws to establish a procedure 
by which shareholder-nominated candidates may be included on the corporate ballot did 
not relate to an election within the meaning of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and therefore could not be 
excluded from corporate proxy materials under that regulation.54 In response to AFSCME 
v. AIG, in 2007 the SEC proposed two alternative rules regarding the election exclusion 
set out in Rule 14a-8. The first would have allowed companies to exclude shareholder 
nomination bylaw proposals from the company’s proxy materials.55 The second proposal, 
on the other hand, would have required companies to include those shareholder proposals 
in company proxy materials upon certain conditions.56 The SEC adopted the first 
proposal, ostensibly to provide certainty to companies and shareholders.57 
Two years later, the Delaware Supreme Court weighed in with CA, Inc. v. 
AFSCME.58 CA, Inc. addressed a proposed shareholder bylaw that would have required 
the Board of Directors of CA, Inc. to reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by 
stockholders in conducting successful proxy contests.59 The court held that while it was a 
proper subject for stockholder action under Delaware law, the proposed bylaw, if 
adopted, could have precluded directors from fully discharging their fiduciary duties.60 
After CA, Inc., Delaware amended the Delaware General Corporation Law to add 
Section 112, which explicitly permits Delaware corporations to provide shareholders with 
access to the corporation’s proxy solicitation materials in order to nominate directors. 
Delaware additionally added Section 113, allowing bylaws that require a corporation to 
reimburse expenses incurred by a stockholder in soliciting proxies to elect directors.61 
Neither is automatic. Each requires that shareholders first propose a bylaw amendment 
 
 52.  DIVISION OF CORP. FIN., SEC, STAFF REPORT-REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE 
NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
proxyreport.pdf.  
 53.  Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,794 (Oct. 23, 2003) (explaining that 
shareholders need to meet ownership threshold for two years as of the date of the nomination).  
 54.  AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2006). Rule 14a-8(i)(8) as then effective provided that 
management could exclude from the company’s proxy materials a shareholder proposal that “relates to an 
election for membership on the company’s board of directors or analogous governing body.” Id. The SEC later 
amended this rule to include nomination of directors as an additional ground for excluding shareholder 
proposals. Id.  
 55.  Exchange Act Release No. 34-56161, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488-96 (Aug. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2007/34-56161.pdf. 
 56.  Exchange Act Release No. 34-56160, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,465-88 (Aug. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2007/34-56160.pdf. 
 57.  Exchange Act Release No. 34-56,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 6, 2007).  
 58.  CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
 59.  Id. at 229. 
 60.  Id. at 240.  
 61.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112–13 (2010). Amended Section 112 is discussed in more detail in Part 
C.1, infra. 
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authorizing the inclusion of shareholder proposals or reimbursement of expenses. 
In May 2009, the SEC voted 3-2 to propose rules that would require companies to 
place shareholder nominees on company proxy materials and additionally to include 
shareholder proposals on proxy access in their proxy materials.62 In the face of 
substantial resistance, and as the new financial regulation was being debated, the SEC 
delayed implementation. After Dodd–Frank was enacted the SEC quickly issued new, 
final rules.63 The rules were immediately challenged and the D.C. Circuit struck them 
down as an impermissible exercise of the SEC’s rulemaking powers before the rules had 
been fully implemented.64 
C. The State of Play on Proxy Access 
1. The SEC’s Basis for Acting 
Chairman Schapiro cited the 2008 financial crisis as a catalyst for the SEC’s push 
for proxy access: 
The nation and the markets have recently experienced, and remain in the midst 
of, one of the most serious economic crises of the past century. This crisis has 
led many to raise serious questions and concerns about the accountability and 
responsiveness of some companies and boards of directors to the interests of 
shareholders. These concerns have included questions about whether Boards 
are exercising appropriate oversight of management, whether Boards are 
appropriately focused on shareholder interests and whether Boards need to be 
more accountable for their decisions regarding such issues as compensation 
structures and risk management.65 
2. The Ill-Fated SEC Proxy Access Rule 
Among other adjustments, the short-lived new SEC proxy access rule created a new 
Rule 14a-11 and modified Rule 14a-8(i)(8).66 Under the new Rule 14a-11, shareholders 
could include their own director nominees in a company’s proxy materials subject to 
certain limitations. Rule 14a-11 was limited with regard to: first, which shareholders 
could nominate directors on the proxy materials; and second, how many directors could 
be nominated by eligible shareholders. 
As noted, Rule 14a-11 imposed minimum shareholding requirements and other 
restrictions on shareholders who wished to invoke proxy access. Shareholders wishing to 
 
 62.  See Exchange Act Release No. 33-9046, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (June 10, 2009) (proposing changes to 
the federal proxy rules). 
 63.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1975 (2010) (authorizing proxy access rule).  
 64.  Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305, 2011 WL 2936808, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011). 
 65.  Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting on Soliciting Shareholder 
Director Nominations (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009mls.htm. 
 66.  Following convention, we will refer to the changes as the proxy access “rule” rather than rules from 
this point forward, although it involves changes to multiple rules and regulations. The new rule is explained in 
detail in Facilitating Director Nominations, Exchange Release Nos. 33-9136; 34-62,764, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 
(Aug. 25, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
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gain access to Rule 14a-11 needed to hold at least three percent of the stock of the 
corporation, either individually or as part of a group.67 Shareholders also were required to 
represent that they have continuously beneficially owned the securities used for the 
purposes of determining the ownership threshold for at least three years as of the date of 
the shareholder notice;68 and that they would continue to own the qualifying securities 
through the date of the annual or special meeting.69 The shareholders must further 
represent that they did not intend to acquire or hold the securities for the purpose of or 
with the effect of changing control of the company or to gain more than a limited number 
of seats on the board,70 and that there was no relationship between the nominees and the 
nominating shareholder or group.71 As we shall see, the three year holding requirement 
would have had the effect of limiting which outsider investors could plausibly take 
advantage of the rule.72 
The second key parameter is the number of directors that shareholder proponents 
would have been entitled to nominate. Rule 14a-11 required a company to include on its 
proxy materials no more than the greater of: one shareholder director nominee, or the 
number of nominees that represented 25% of the company’s board of directors.73 This 
provision was designed to ensure that shareholders did not use this new rule to effect a 
change of control. If multiple shareholders or shareholder groups were eligible to 
nominate directors, the shareholder group with the highest percentage of stock would be 
able to include up to the maximum number of shareholder nominees allowable in the 
company’s proxy materials.74 If this shareholder or shareholder group did not use up the 
maximum number of nominations allowed, then the shareholder or group with the next 
largest stake could submit its nominations.75 This would continue until the maximum 
number of allotted nominations was used up.76 
3. Delaware’s Limited Addition to Proxy Access 
On July 24, 2009, Delaware amended Section 112 to authorize shareholders to 
amend a company’s bylaws to require the company to include shareholder nominated 
directors on proxy materials: 
The bylaws may provide that if the corporation solicits proxies with respect to 
an election of directors, it may be required, to the extent and subject to such 
procedures or conditions as may be provided in the bylaws, to include in its 
proxy solicitation materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), in 
addition to individuals nominated by the board of directors, one or more 
 
 67.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b)(1) (2009). 
 68.  Id. § 240.14a-11(b)(2). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. § 240.14(a)-11(b)(6). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing hedge funds’ use of the proxy process).  
 73.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(d)(1). 
 74.  Id. § 240.14(d)(3). As we shall see, Italian corporate law offers a more sensible alternative that does 
not privilege the shareholders who file first. See infra notes 102–03 (providing information about Italian 
corporate law).  
 75.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(1). 
 76.  Id. 
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individuals nominated by a stockholder.77 
A key difference between Delaware’s new law and the SEC proxy access rule is that 
Delaware’s Section 112 requires a shareholder (except in the unlikely situation where the 
directors themselves amend the bylaws in this regard) to persuade fellow shareholders to 
adopt a bylaw amendment requiring that their board nominees be included on proxy 
materials, whereas the SEC rule requires inclusion in the first instance. Another way of 
looking at it is that Delaware has essentially established an “opt-in” shareholder nominee 
proxy access regime while the SEC has established an “opt-out” regime. 
It is not clear what Delaware sought to do with the new Section 112. Even before the 
new Section 112, Delaware law probably allowed a corporation’s bylaws or charter to 
provide proxy access.78 If we assume that the new provision at least removes uncertainty 
about the legality of a bylaw proposal calling for proxy access, there remains the question 
of why Delaware would adopt such a limited reform—a reform that allows for the 
possibility of proxy access, but requires shareholders to first wage a full-blown proxy 
contest over the bylaw that would authorize it. The most likely explanation is that 
Delaware was sending a signal to Congress. Recent scholarship has pointed out that 
Delaware’s main competition as the leading source of corporate law is Congress, not the 
states.79 Particularly in recent years, a variety of developments in Delaware seemed 
designed to show that Delaware “gets it”—that Delaware is effectively regulating 
corporate law, and that Congress therefore does not need to step in.80 This suggests that 
Delaware may have enacted Section 112 in order to preempt SEC intervention on proxy 
access. If preemption was the motive, Delaware’s intervention was unsuccessful, given 
the SEC’s immediate re-occupation of the field. With the SEC rule at least temporarily 
invalidated, however, the Delaware changes have become significant once again. 
4. Delaware’s New Proxy Expense Rule 
Delaware’s new Section 113, which authorizes shareholder bylaws that require their 
company to reimburse proxy expenses in a directorial contest, effectively overrules the 
CA, Inc. case and thus marks a genuine increase in shareholder power under Delaware 
law.81 With the corporation paying expenses, shareholders could more easily exercise 
power in director elections. One caveat is that like Section 112, Section 113 is an opt-in 
section,82 so shareholders must first amend the bylaws to obtain this grant of greater 
shareholder power. 
 
 77.  H.B. 19, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009), available at http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis145.nsf/ 
vwLegislation/HB+19/$file/legis.html?open. 
 78.  See, e.g., Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Meetings: A Revolution in the 
Making? (Feb. 24 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558467 (discussing the limits of legislative and regulatory initiatives for proxy 
access). 
 79.  Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592 (2003). 
 80.  See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1934–36 
(1991) (describing Delaware’s Paramount v. Time decision in these terms). 
 81.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (2010). 
 82.  Id.  
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D. Proxy Access: Current Scholarly Debate 
For over 60 years, the SEC has been fluctuating between increasing shareholder 
rights and retreating from its role as shareholder advocate. When the SEC issued the 
proposal (Proposal) that led to the short-lived new rule, the Proposal received a massive 
amount of comments.83 A survey undertaken by Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP upon 
review of 41 of the comment letters submitted to the SEC summarizes the main concerns 
and issues raised by several constituencies.84 These comments closely track the academic 
debate on proxy access, and sharply frame the current views. 
Public pension funds, institutional shareholders, and shareholder activists were 
among the principal proponents of the Proposal. The Council of Institutional Investors 
advocated “reasonable” access by long-term shareholders as well as groups of 
shareholders to company proxy materials to nominate directors.85 On the other hand, the 
Proposal was fiercely opposed by the Business Roundtable,86 the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce,87 and many major corporate law firms.88 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
warned, for example, of the costs of the “unwise, unnecessary” Proposal, and the danger 
that it would weaken the functioning of the board and would favor some shareholders 
over others.89 
The academic debate divided along similar lines. Supporters of the Proposal argued 
that proxy access should be the default rule, because it is easier for directors to propose 
that the company opt-out than for shareholders to successfully wage a campaign to 
pursue the company to opt-in.90 According to Lucian Bebchuk, the most prominent 
academic advocate for increased shareholder voting power,91 “the choice of default in 
corporate and securities law should depend on which selection would be more easily 
 
 83.  The Proposal received 534 comment letters. Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating Director 
Nominations, SEC, www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009.shtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). 
 84.  DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, 2009 PROXY ACCESS PROPOSAL: REPRESENTATIVE SEC COMMENT 
LETTERS (2009), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/Documents/Proxy_access_ 
comment_letter_matrix.pdf. 
 85.  Letter from Jeff Mahoney, General Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors to Elizabeth Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC 2 (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-78.pdf. 
 86.  “This is an unprecedented preemption of state corporate law—the bedrock of corporate governance—
that will turn the boards of more than 15,000 publicly-traded companies into political bodies and threaten their 
ability to function.” John J. Castellani, President, Bus. Roundtable, Address at Business Roundtable on SEC 
Proxy Access Proposal (May 20, 2009), available at http://businessroundtable.org/news-center/business-
roundtable-statement-on-sec-proxy-access-proposal/. 
 87.  See generally Letter from David T. Hirschman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, SEC 
(Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/comments/090814_proxyaccess.pdf 
(expressing opposition to proposal).  
 88.  See generally Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al. to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, SEC 
(Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-212.pdf. 
 89.  Letter from David T. Hirschman, supra note 87, at 2. 
 90.  See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate 6 
(Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 653, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1513408 (advocating rejection of no-access as the default and implementation of an 
opt-out process with necessary safeguards to increase shareholder power). 
 91.  See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV 836 
(2005) (arguing for increasing shareholder power). 
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‘reversible’ by shareholders wishing to see it changed.”92 In Bebchuk’s view, the 
“asymmetry between opt-outs favored and disfavored by the board strengthens the case 
for selecting proxy access as the default rule.”93 Because shareholders cannot easily opt-
in or opt-out of rules without the board’s support, it is therefore difficult for shareholders 
to adopt desirable rules that boards oppose.94 
Some supporters advocated proxy access but did not endorse all the details of the 
Proposal. A group of law professors argued in a letter to the SEC that the one percent 
threshold in the original Proposal was “too low” and could lead to “chaotic elections,” 
which would consequently distract the board.95 As a first step, they proposed to raise the 
threshold to a range of five to ten percent, which could be lowered and adjusted 
subsequently to the market’s response to the application of the Proposal. 
Opponents called for private ordering and opposed the implementation of a uniform 
mandatory proxy access rule. They called for a more “incremental approach” that would 
simply amend Rule 14a-8 to preclude companies from excluding proposed proxy access 
bylaw changes from the company’s proxy materials.96 They characterized this approach 
as the traditional state law framework. 
Perhaps the most remarkable attribute of the debate is that no one argued that proxy 
access should be prohibited altogether.97 Opponents argued only that shareholders should 
be required to demonstrate their support for it by affirmatively opting in, not that proxy 
access should be prohibited. It is impossible and impractical, they argued, to establish a 
mandatory federal proxy access regime that is applicable to 12,000 publicly traded 
companies in the United States.98 Similarly, the Delaware State Bar Association 
criticized the proposal as “inconsistent with the overall philosophy of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law: to enable stockholders and boards to establish their own 
corporation’s internal rules in light of the wide variety of circumstances in which 
Delaware corporations function, rather than to limit their ability to do so.”99 
 
 92.  Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 90, at 10 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal 
Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 489 (2002)). 
 93.  Id. at 11. 
 94.  Similarly, Marco Ventoruzzo points out that only three out of hundreds of listed companies 
incorporated in Delaware have adopted proxy access under unique circumstances. Ventoruzzo, supra note 78, at 
19. Unlike Bebchuk, Ventoruzzo argues that shareholders should be guaranteed representation on the board as 
under Italian law, a stance we discuss in Part E below. Id.  
 95.  Letter from Harvard Business and Law Professors to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC 2 (Aug. 
13, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-164.pdf. 
 96.  See Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al., supra note 88, at 7. One of the SEC 
commissioners, Troy Paredes, took a similar stance. Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner of the SEC, Statement at 
Open Meeting to Propose Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 
2009), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.htm (recommending “amending Rule 
14(a)-8(i)(8) to permit shareholders to include in the company’s jurisdiction of incorporation has adopted a 
provision explicitly authorizing a proxy access by law”). 
 97.  Annette L. Nazareth, SEC Urged to Defer Adopting Proxy Access Rules, HARVARD LAW SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOV. AND FIN. REGULATION (Oct. 6, 2009), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/10/06/sec-urged-
to-defer-adopting-proxy-access-rules/. 
 98.  See Joseph Grundfest, The SECs Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 
BUS. LAW. 361, 363 (2010) (arguing that it makes more sense to support a fully enabling approach to proxy 
access that allows all publicly traded corporations to determine the rules governing shareholder access to 
corporate proxy by majority vote). 
 99.  Letter from the Delaware State Bar Association to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC 5 (July 24, 
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E. An Italian Alternative 
In Italy, unlike the United States, the principal agency problem is not between the 
shareholders and managers but rather between shareholders with a controlling interest 
and the minority shareholders.100 The most obvious responses to the conflict are either to 
reserve a seat on the board for minority shareholders or to limit the voting rights of the 
majority shareholders. Since the end of 2005, Italy has adopted the former approach, 
requiring that at least one position on the board of directors be reserved for minority 
shareholders.101 On the basis of the 2005 law, all listed corporations were required to 
amend their bylaws to give force to this provision and ensure that at least one director on 
their boards was elected by means of a so-called alternative list to represent the interests 
of minority shareholders.102 The law gave companies flexibility in determining the 
minimum amount of stock a minority shareholder or group needed to have to present its 
own “slate” of directorial nominees, but required that the percentage be not greater than 
2.5%.103 
It is worth pausing to note how far the Italian approach to protecting minority 
shareholders diverges from U.S. corporate governance. In the United States, the 
watchword is shareholder power and proxy access is designed to make shareholder voting 
more meaningful. In Italy, by contrast, shareholder voting is secondary; the objective is to 
put minority representatives on the board. The most obvious explanation for the 
distinction is the prevalence of controlling shareholder blocks in Italy, as compared to the 
more fluid nature of shareholdings in the United States. But the distinction also seems to 
reflect different emphases in the two countries: voting is privileged in the United States, 
negotiation (with minority shareholders given a seat at the table) in Italy. 
Prior to a March 2006 revision of the Italian Stock Exchange’s corporate governance 
code, election of directors was conducted by means of secret ballot. This caused a serious 
problem in ensuring that the minority shareholder chose the minority representative as it 
was impossible to ascertain which shareholders were voting for the different slates of 
directors. In March 2006, the Italian Stock Exchange revised its Corporate Governance 
Code to recommend that: “(a) Italian listed companies, while complying with the secret 
ballot requirement, still ‘ensure transparency in the selection and appointment process of 
directors’ and (b) qualified shareholders of Italian listed companies (including controlling 
shareholders and institutional investors) spontaneously declare their votes in the 
shareholders’ meetings for the appointment of the directors.”104 
 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-65.pdf. 
 100.  See, e.g., Marcello Bianchi et al., Pyramidal Groups and the Separation between Ownership and 
Control in Italy, in THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 154 (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001) 
(analyzing the high concentration of direct ownership in the Italian corporate governance system). 
 101.  Legge 28 dicembre 2005, n. 262 (It.). 
 102.  C. Malberti & E. Sironi, The Mandatory Representation of Minority Shareholders on the Board of 
Directors of Italian Listed Corporations: An Empirical Analysis 2 (Bocconi Univ. Inst. of Comparative Law, 
Research Paper No. 18, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965398. 
 103.  Id. at 7. In addition, under Article 148, par. 2, of the TUIF, CONSOB, the Italian securities regulator, 
was required to mandate a procedure to be followed by listed companies for the election of a representative of 
the minority shareholders to represent them on the board of auditors, thus taking away the power of the 
companies to formulate their own election and nomination processes. Id. at 12.  
 104.  Stefano Crosio & Gherardo Cadore, New Corporate Governance and Minority Shareholder 
Protection Rules for Italian Listed Companies, THE METRO CORP. COUNSEL, May 2006, at 36, available at 
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An issue that has generated widespread discussion in Italy, and may also have 
relevance for the United States, is the question whether minority shareholders will in fact 
place directors on the boards of most large Italian companies. The number of minority 
directors remains quite small; some observers suspect that the controlling shareholders of 
some companies have struck deals with the largest minority shareholders in return for the 
shareholders’ promise not to propose a slate of directors.105 This observation echoes 
concerns that proxy access in the United States will be used strategically, though the 
concerns are in sense mirror images: in Italy, the issue is hidden deals; in the United 
States it is, as discussed in the next Part, strategic use by outsiders of the “megaphone” of 
a public directorial election process. 
F. Proposals 
The scholarly debate on proxy access in general, and on the ill-fated SEC rules in 
particular, divides along much the same lines as the comment letters discussed earlier. In 
the discussion that follows, we briefly summarize the debate. Throughout the discussion, 
we highlight its implications for inside-out governance. 
One problematic feature of the new rule was its inclusion of only the proposal made 
by the shareholder or group with the largest stake.106 This process runs directly counter 
to how a shareholder meeting would work. At an ordinary shareholder meeting, any 
shareholder—or any shareholder meeting a qualifying minimum stock ownership 
threshold—would be permitted to nominate a director, not just the shareholder with the 
highest percentage.107 The rule also limited access to shareholders who have held the 
stock for three years,108 which serves no evident purpose other than discouraging 
investors like hedge funds who buy stock in order to shake up the company’s governance 
from making use of proxy access. 
There is no reason to believe that minority directors would routinely be elected, but 
this is not inherently problematic. In the United States, unlike in Italy, the empowerment 
of minority shareholders, with minority representation on the board, is less essential, 
given the relative paucity of American firms that are dominated by a controlling 
 
http://www.metro corpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/May/36.pdf.  
 105.  Evasion of the new governance rules was also a major concern after the major financial scandals 
broke out in the early 2000s. In spite of the existence of corporate governance rules in the form of the Preda 
Code, many Italian companies were either not following the code or circumventing its provisions. For example, 
if one looks at the board of directors of Parmalat Finanziaria it may be noted that the Board was composed of 13 
members. Four of them, including the Chairman-CEO, were linked by family ties. With regard to the 
composition of the board, it is also interesting to observe that eight Parmalat Finanziaria directors also sat on the 
board of directors of Parmalat S.p.A., including all the members of the executive committee and one non-
executive director. Thus, the company was not following the corporate governance requirements stipulated 
under the Preda Code. Andrea Melis, Corporate Governance Failures: to What Extent is Parmalat a 
Particularly Italian Case?, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 478, 484 (2005), available at www.csid.com.cn/upfile/vod/ 
EU_SMEs/coporate%20governance.pdf. 
 106.  See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. and Italian approaches to nomination of 
directors by shareholder proponents).  
 107.  Delaware leaves the specific mechanics of elections to the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 
(2009). 
 108.  See note 68 and accompanying text (noting that Rule 14a-11 required shareholders seeking to invoke 
proxy access to hold the requisite amount of stock for three years).  
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shareholder. Moreover, it is not clear that new minority directors would often improve 
firm performance. While many support having a majority of independent directors,109 
and some have called for a “devil’s advocate” or “chief naysayer” on the board,110 there 
is no strong correlation between board composition and firm performance. Several 
studies suggest that a board composed of a supermajority of independent directors may 
even perform worse than firms without such boards.111 
Much of the criticism of the new rule, both before and after its promulgation, 
focused on the possibility that unions and pension funds may use the new shareholder 
empowerment strategically. Joseph Grundfest argued, for instance, that the rule will 
create “megaphone externalities,” by enabling institutional shareholders, who have no 
knowledge of corporate governance or who might be motivated by political or not-for-
profit goals, to place directors on the board who would be disruptive, and only interested 
in pushing an agenda which is not in the best interest of the corporation.112 This concern 
seems overstated, however. Union funds generally do not hold enough stock to meet the 
three percent threshold.113 In consequence, their frequent use of Rule 14a-8 to include 
proxy proposals in the company’s proxy materials, which requires only $2000 in stock 
holdings,114 does not mean they would be similarly active in invoking proxy access. 
Michael Wachter and William Bratton have recently suggested a different argument 
against proxy access.115 Reform agendas that increase shareholder power, they claim, 
would undermine efficient corporate decision making by forcing managers to manage to 
the market.116 While this is a legitimate concern, access to nominating directors, unlike 
involvement in business decision-making that has long been reserved for directors and 
management, is a traditional shareholder right granted by state law.117 Moreover, their 
concern that managerial prerogatives be respected is in a sense a plea for traditional 
insider corporate governance in the face of an increasingly pervasive shift to inside-out 
governance. 
In our view, if the SEC reintroduces the rule, it should alter the rule’s shareholding 
requirements in two ways to better maintain the historical continuity of shareholding 
while recognizing the interconnected, inside-out character of current corporate 
 
 109.  BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 10 (Sept. 1997), available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/businessroundtable.pdf. 
 110.  Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and 
Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 740–47 (2005).  
 111.  Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 940–56 (1999); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with 
a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 191 (1996). 
 112.  Grundfest, supra note 98, at 380–83. A recent article by J.W. Verret takes a different approach. Verret 
offers a long list of strategies that directors can use to thwart invocation of proxy access. J.W. Verret, Defending 
Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s Future Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd–
Frank (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 10-37, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1655482.  
 113.  See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access 85 (Oct. 21, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695682.  
 114.  SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009). 
 115.  William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 653 (2010). 
 116.  Id. at 659.  
 117.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2009) (directors chosen by shareholder vote). 
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governance. The most important problem is the three-year holding requirement. Given 
that the outsiders most likely to use the proxy process are hedge funds, and hedge funds 
rarely hold stock for long periods, the holding requirement makes the new rule 
incoherent: it purports to facilitate outside governance, yet stymies the one constituency 
that is most likely to use it.118 In our view, sharply reducing the holding period is 
essential. 
In contrast to the holding period, which should be reduced, the three percent 
shareholding requirement should be raised to at least five percent. Setting the threshold at 
five percent, and permitting every shareholder or group that qualified to nominate 
directors would further discourage the use of proxy access purely for megaphone reasons, 
as megaphone shareholders often own fairly low percentages of the company’s stock. 
Proxy access would be used more often by multiple shareholders working together, and it 
would more closely replicate the shareholder meetings of the pre-proxy era, where each 
shareholder or shareholder group would have represented a meaningful block of the 
company’s stock. At the same time, it would not destabilize inside governance because 
minority representation is limited and the access could not be used for a takeover. 
III. THIRD-PARTY GATEKEEPERS: AUDITORS AND CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
A. Introduction 
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, investors in the United States are once again 
cognizant of the reliance on third-party gatekeepers that was often the focus of concern 
following the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s. In this Part, we will 
evaluate two significant and analogous gatekeepers in the U.S. market: auditing firms and 
credit rating agencies. Both shape many investors’ investment decisions, with auditors 
providing the public’s primary “check” on corporate financial reporting and credit rating 
agencies serving, in many contexts, as the primary external evaluators of corporate debt. 
Both also are the earliest and most familiar exemplars of inside-out governance. 
We begin by surveying the historical development of the two industries, as well as 
current proposals for reform—both in terms of ex ante regulation and ex post loss 
allocation through litigation. In the second Part, we examine the recent scholarly debate. 
We then draw on insights from Italy and the European Union in developing our own 
proposed treatment of auditors and credit rating agencies. In the final Part, we use the 
insights of the earlier discussion and analysis to assess the new Dodd–Frank reforms, 
some of which mirror our own analysis but others of which do not. Although inside-out 
governance creates a serious conflict of interest that cannot realistically be removed, we 
conclude that several simple reforms could limit its detrimental effects. 
 
 118.  Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock make a similar point. They show that the constituency most likely to use 
the proxy process with large firms is hedge funds, yet hedge funds do not hold stock for long periods. Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 113. For smaller firms, the most active constituency is ex-insiders. Id.  
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B. History of Auditing and Credit Rating 
1. History of the Auditing Industry in the United States 
Efforts to set and enforce profession-wide standards in auditing date back to 1941, 
when the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) was formed to govern the practice of internal 
auditing.119 The next major advance came in 1947, when the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants’ adopted the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS). The standards seek to ensure that auditors have both the technical training 
required and an independent perspective on their work so that opinions on financial 
statements’ compliance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) will 
be meaningful.120 
The collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco in 2001 and 2002 brought major 
agency problems in the accounting industry to light. Because the auditors’ largest clients 
were so important to their bottom line (or in the case of Arthur Andersen, the bottom line 
of a segment of the firm), the auditors faced tremendous pressure to whitewash any 
problems discovered in the audit.121 Many commentators also believe that accounting 
firm’s desire to obtain lucrative consulting work from their audit clients also discouraged 
tough audits.122 
In 2002, Congress responded to the auditing fraud scandals by passing the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX).123 SOX set forth standards for both the internal and external 
auditing functions in public companies. Significant requirements of SOX included 
provisions for increasing the independence of interests between external auditors and 
management (through mechanisms like the study of an auditor rotation requirement and a 
prohibition on auditors’ providing consulting or other services to clients),124 an 
expansion of the requirements for financial disclosures,125 and the creation of criminal 
liability for executives who fraudulently certify the accuracy of a firm’s financial 
statements.126 SOX also created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), an agency that evaluates auditing firms’ compliance with the Act.127 These 
reforms have been among the more successful of the SOX reforms, but problems remain, 
as we shall see.128 
 
 119.  About the Institute of Internal Auditors, INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, 
http://www.theiia.org/theiia/about-the-institute/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). 
 120.  AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, GENERALLY ACCEPTED AUDITING STANDARDS 
(2001), available at www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/au-00150.pdf. 
 121.  COFFEE, supra note 1.  
 122.  Enron filed for bankruptcy on November 30, 2001 and WorldCom on July 21, 2002. Along with the 
collapse of the companies, several executives of Enron and WorldCom were criminally convicted. Arthur 
Andersen LLP forfeited its CPA license after being convicted of obstruction of justice in 2002. The conviction 
was later vacated in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005), but Arthur Andersen LLP is 
no longer a viable participant in the auditing industry. These developments are discussed in some detail in id.  
 123.  Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2(a), 116 Stat. 745, 746 (2002) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7201 (2009)). 
 124.  Id. §§ 201(b)–209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7231–34). 
 125.  Id. § 401 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7261). 
 126.  Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241); id. § 906(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350). 
 127.  Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 101 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211). 
 128.  One irony of SOX is that some of its other provisions—most importantly, the requirement in Section 
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2. History of the Credit Rating Industry in the United States 
Despite the significant impact of credit rating agencies’ evaluations on the investor 
community, the industry has been largely unregulated. In 1973, the SEC promulgated 
Rule 15c3-1, which incorporated the ratings of “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations” (NRSROs) into broker-dealers’ permitted calculation of capital 
requirements.129 The new rule greatly expanded the significance of credit ratings. 
After the fall of Enron and WorldCom, potential regulation of credit rating agencies 
was once again at the forefront of financial regulation concerns. Tentative strides toward 
greater regulation in the industry came with the passage of SOX in 2002. Under Section 
702 (b), the SEC was required to prepare a report evaluating the performance of credit 
rating agencies.130 In January 2003, the SEC issued its report, discussing conflicts of 
interest and the lack of transparency in the industry.131 In its report, the SEC highlighted 
the most troublesome practices in the credit-rating industry, including the conflict 
inherent in the standard “issuer pays” model (in which the issuer pays a credit-rating 
agency to rate its securities), conflicts arising from credit-rating agencies’ offering of 
consulting services to firms that they rate, and the inadequacy of agencies’ disclosure of 
the rationale behind ratings.132 The report was opened for public comments in June 
2003.133 
As a result, Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.134 The 
Act requires the SEC to precisely define the requirements for NRSRO registration.135 It 
also gives the SEC authority to regulate matters of internal control in credit-rating 
agencies.136 In 2007, the SEC promulgated rules to implement the Act. 
C. Recent Developments in the Regulation of Auditors and CRAs 
1. Developments in the Auditing Industry 
Since the passage of SOX in 2002, the auditing industry has seen little regulatory 
development. The most important controversy has involved a constitutional challenge to 
the PCAOB. The Supreme Court upheld the Board in summer 2010, ending the 
uncertainty over its status.137 
 
404 that companies establish internal controls—created a huge increase in demand for auditors’ services, 
despite the fact that auditors had performed so poorly in their gatekeeping role before the scandals. Id. § 404 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).  
 129.  SEC Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2009).  
 130.  Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 702(b).  
 131.  SEC, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE 
SECURITIES MARKETS (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/creditrating report0103.pdf.  
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. § 4 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78–80 (2006)). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Free Enterprise v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (finding constitutional 
infirmities in some aspects of the Board’s structure but declining to enjoin its operation). 
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2. Current Developments in the Credit Rating Industry 
Concerns about credit-rating agencies figured much more prominently in the 
legislative debate around financial regulation, than in the legislation that passed. The 
most important change, which mirrors the approach we advocate below, is to delete the 
references to credit ratings in a variety of laws and regulations.138 The practical effect, if 
the instructions are fully implemented, will be to remove pressure on insurance 
companies, pension funds, and others to invest in securities that have been given a credit-
rating agency’s seal of approval. The new legislation also makes it somewhat easier to 
sue a credit agency by stating that the Exchange Act of 1934 applies to credit-rating 
agencies to the same extent as to accounting firms and securities analysts.139 If this 
provision is implemented, it will mark a major expansion of potential liability, and it will 
figure prominently in our discussion below (as an after-the-fact, or ex post, mechanism 
for policing these gatekeepers). 
Finally, Dodd–Frank imposes other requirements on credit rating agencies, to be 
implemented primarily through the SEC’s authority over Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs).140 Under Dodd–Frank, the Commission will 
review the process and performance of credit rating agencies to evaluate the agencies’ 
internal controls.141 It will also require agencies to disclose (to a limited extent) the 
methodologies by which they establish credit ratings for structured securities.142 Dodd–
Frank further mandates certain corporate governance mechanisms in NRSROs, including 
requirements that one-half of an agency’s Board of Directors be independent directors 
and that some must be “ratings users.”143 It also empowers the Commission to 
promulgate rules for the disclosure of conflicts of interest, and for prohibitions on rating 
agencies’ providing certain other advising services to the firms whose securities they are 
rating.144 
D. Auditing: Problems and Solutions from the Current Debate 
1. The Agency Problem 
In the absence of correctives, the managers of publicly-held corporations lack strong 
incentives to act efficiently due to the separation of management and risk-bearing; that is, 
managers do not bear the costs or reap the benefits of their actions.145 Auditors help to 
 
 138.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 939, 939A, 
124 Stat. 1370, 1885–88 (2010); SEC, REPORT ON REVIEW OF RELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS (2011), available 
at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/939astudy.pdf; FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS ON CREDIT RATINGS (2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-
reports/files/credit-ratings-report-201107.pdf. 
 139.  Dodd–Frank § 933. 
 140.  Id. §§  933(a), 934, 935 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2009)). Note that, under the Act, an agency 
would be permitted to withdraw from registration with the SEC upon a showing that it receives less than $250 
million in annual revenue from credit rating services. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 6002(a)(5) (2009). 
 141.  Dodd–Frank § 932. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
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police this conflict of interests by providing objective outside oversight of the 
corporation’s financial statements.146 However, an agency problem is inherent in the 
system: because management pays the auditor’s salary, the auditor will be tempted to 
please the managers, rather than providing tough scrutiny.147 The conflict stemming from 
this inside-out dynamic may be exacerbated if the auditor also performs consulting 
services for the company, or wishes to do so, because the auditor may fear that the 
company will withhold consulting opportunities if it is dissatisfied with the audit. 
Gatekeeper failure was a central theme of the corporate scandals in the early 
2000s.148 During the Enron-era financial scandals, auditors seemed to submit to 
management’s authority in order to reap the rewards from managers.149 Auditors 
“acquiesced in managerial fraud,” behavior that was the result of trends that were long in 
development.150 
2. Scholars’ Solutions and Skepticism 
Some scholars have argued that auditors’ conflict of interest was magnified in the 
1990s by accounting firms’ desire to secure consulting work from their audit clients.151 
But it is not clear whether this actually exacerbated the existing conflict. In a survey of 
the existing empirical literature, Roberta Romano did not find any evidence that an 
auditor’s performance of consulting functions impaired the quality of its audit.152 
Romano characterizes SOX’s restrictions on auditing firms’ performance of non-audit 
services as an unsubstantiated leap.153 
3. The Limits of SOX 
SOX partially addressed the agency problem of auditors by transferring the hiring 
and supervision of the auditor to a firm’s internal audit committee, which is supposed to 
be independent.154 But the company itself, rather than shareholders or a third party, still 
makes the decision about which auditor to use.155 SOX did not attempt to eliminate the 
longstanding inside-out dimension of the audit function. 
While SOX focused on ex ante correctives, the prospect of ex post liability also is an 
important factor in auditor performance. SOX did little to reverse a pattern of restrictions 
 
271, 277 (1986).  
 146.  Id. 
 147.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308 (2004).  
 148.  John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction: Where Was the SEC When the Mutual Fund Scandal 
Happened?, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 46.  
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Coffee, supra note 147, at 304. 
 151.  Id. at 322.  
 152.  Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1542 (2005). 
 153.  Id. at 1543. The prohibition is Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 
745, 771–72 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2009)). 
 154.  Coffee, supra note 147, at 336. 
 155.  Roberta Romano’s survey of empirical studies raises appreciable doubt as to whether requiring that 
the directors on the audit committee be independent improves auditors performance. Romano, supra note 152, 
at 1530. 
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on auditor liability dating back to the 1990s. Auditors faced a higher chance of litigation 
before the 1990s brought the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act156 and the Supreme 
Court’s 1994 Central Bank of Denver case, which held that Rule 10b-5 did not reach 
those “aiding and abetting” securities fraud.157 These two events sharply reduced the 
likelihood of auditor liability. Even after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, litigation 
against auditing firms is uncommon,158 although several judicial decisions have 
reinvigorated aiding and abetting liability.159 
4. Scholars’ Proposals for Auditing Reform 
Auditors’ effectiveness as monitors can be increased by either ex ante or ex post 
mechanisms, as we have seen. A vibrant literature has developed on both. Because the 
leading ex ante proposals call for major structural changes to the audit relationship—a 
complete reworking of the inside-out relationship between auditors and the corporation—
we begin with the debate over ex post liability rules. We then turn to the proposed ex ante 
correctives. 
a. Ex Post Litigation 
Under current law, a shareholder plaintiff must show that the auditor acted 
recklessly or knowingly—that is, with scienter.160 Some scholars, such as Frank Partnoy, 
believe that strict liability is the best way to prevent auditor misconduct.161 Even critics 
of strict liability recognize three benefits: (1) auditors would have greater incentive to act 
cautiously and exercise due diligence; (2) auditors would limit their level of activity by 
rejecting overly risky clients; and (3) courts and regulators would be saved immense 
costs and time.162 Opponents of strict liability fear, however, that it could have the 
unwanted consequence of excluding law-abiding yet riskier clients from accessing the 
markets, or could even lead to failure in the market for auditors.163 
Strict liability also would exacerbate the weakening of legal privilege that has 
characterized the post-Enron era. Spooked by the collapse of Arthur Andersen, external 
 
 156.  Public Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).  
 157.  Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
 158.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1550 (2006) (noting auditors were named as defendants in only 
eight cases during 2004 and 2005).  
 159.  Most importantly, in a case involving Enron, the court ruled that primary liability can extend to any 
person who contributes materially false or misleading information in the creation of an SEC document. Coffee, 
supra note 147, at 337–38.  
 160.  See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring scienter in cases brought 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).  
 161.  See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability 
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001) (arguing for imposing strict liability for material misstatements and 
omissions in offering documents).  
 162.  Coffee, supra note 147, at 347.  
 163.  See Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 76 (2003) (arguing that increased 
fees associated with liability could drive out law-abiding clients who are unwilling to incur higher fees); see 
also Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 53, 77 (1986) (suggesting that high costs associated with risks creates market disadvantages for law-
abiding auditors).  
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auditors have become much more aggressive in collecting information.164 Corporations 
increasingly are pressured to disclose documents that would legally be “protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine” as auditing firms 
emulate the government and demand these documents.165 Auditors have also insisted on 
costly investigations whenever circumstances seem even mildly suspicious, resulting in 
further danger to the legal protection some documents rightly enjoy.166 
 Although unlimited strict liability could make auditors’ job too costly to 
perform,167 Partnoy’s modified system, which would limit the maximum permissible 
damages, might reduce the burden while avoiding many of the costs of other 
approaches.168 Several scholars contend that even a modified strict liability regime would 
be too harsh. Assaf Hamdani argues, for instance, that forcing all auditors to internalize 
the cost of fraudulent activity from the outset of employment with a client could 
potentially force law-abiding clients and auditors out of the market.169 A lawsuit against 
one branch of an international network could bring down the entire network. John Coffee 
also questions the potential harshness of Partnoy’s proposal.170 With strict liability, 
auditors might charge clients higher fees. A client that an auditor considers a higher risk 
of fraud could be charged especially high costs.171 Although the deterrent effect could be 
beneficial, there is no real guide to distinguishing honest clients from fraudulent ones at 
the outset of a business relationship. As Coffee notes, “some clients within each category 
will pay too little and others too much.”172 
Coffee himself proposes “stricter”—not strict or modified strict—liability.173 The 
auditor would have a certification backed by an insurance policy, which would be capped 
at a realistic level.174 As with strict liability, the gatekeeper would not need to be charged 
with any showing of fault, but his liability would be limited to the amount that achieves 
adequate deterrence. Under the proposal, if a client were found liable, the auditor would 
contribute to that liability up to the amount of his insurance.175 
Rather than pick one of strict liability approaches, or reject them altogether, we 
believe the most sensible approach is to allow auditors and firms to establish their 
 
 164.  Mark Gideon & Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate Cooperation During Investigations and Audits, 13 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 22 (2007).  
 165.  Id.  
 166.  See id. at 22–24 (noting that investigations can lead to disclosure to external audit or waiving 
privilege).  
 167.  See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 163, at 77 (noting that if costs of performance were too high, clients 
may seek “pliable gatekeepers”).  
 168.  See Partnoy, supra note 161, at 545 (arguing that modified system reduces insurance costs by 
eliminating defense litigation costs).  
 169.  Hamdani, supra note 163, at 63.  
 170.  Coffee, supra note 147. 
 171.  See id. at 347 (describing attractions of higher auditor fees).  
 172.  Id.  
 173.  Id. at 349.  
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Coffee, supra note 147, at 350. Coffee would also put a minimum floor on the policy. Id. Grundfest 
questions whether an insurance and indemnification regime for auditors would deter securities fraud, because it 
would allow the auditors to externalize their liability. Joseph A. Grundfest, former Commissioner, SEC, 
Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, Stanford Law School (Feb. 4, 2008), available 
at http://comments.treas.gov/_files/Grundfest.pdf. 
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liability framework by contract, subject to a statutory minimum.176 We are not the first to 
advocate this approach. Peter Wyman, former partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers, has 
sought for some time to convince the SEC to embrace a contractual approach. Wyman’s 
principal concern is that litigation could destroy one of the four remaining big accounting 
firms, and he envisions that firms and their auditors would sharply restrict liability.177 
We think this is possible, but we also suspect that many of the contracts would provide 
for meaningful, though likely capped, liability. The contractual approach would not 
eliminate inside-out governance, but it would invigorate the ex post oversight of auditors. 
b. Ex Ante Reform: Restructuring the Audit Relationship 
Rather than seeking to improve the existing ex post liability structure, other scholars 
have called for a restructuring of the auditor–client relationship. Joshua Ronen and 
Lawrence Cunningham both propose an ex ante insurance structure.178 According to 
Ronen, the threat of liability is not strong enough to balance the potential rewards to 
auditors of doing management’s bidding.179 He argues that no outside force—legislation, 
regulation, or litigation—can cure the conflict of interest between management as 
principal and auditors as agents.180 Only complete removal of the agency relationship—
in our terms, pure outside governance—can adequately address the conflict. The auditor 
should be connected to a principal whose economic interests reflect the investors’ 
interests. Under the reforms proposed by Ronen and Cunningham, corporations would 
not hire and pay auditors; rather, corporations would buy financial statement insurance, 
providing coverage for any misrepresentations in the financial reports of auditors.181 The 
insurance carriers would hire and pay the auditors.182 
According to Ronen, financial statement insurance would realign the incentives of 
auditors and management with shareholders and all other players.183 As it stands 
currently, auditors will likely give managers the benefit of the doubt when faced with 
questionable information, due to fear of losing future revenues.184 If the auditor’s client 
is an insurance company, on the other hand, it has an incentive to be much more 
searching. In addition to shifting to an insurance model, Ronen calls for GAAP reforms 
that redefine what parts of a financial statement can and should be audited.185 
Specifically, financial statement elements that inherently are not verifiable would not be 
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audited.186 As we discuss further below, we are skeptical about several aspects of the 
proposals, including the assumption that GAAP rules could effectively distinguish 
between verifiable and non-verifiable information and the likelihood that the market for 
financial statement insurance would function efficiently. We also are not optimistic that 
inside-out governance can be avoided. 
E. Credit Rating Agencies: Problems and Solutions from the Current Debate 
1. Introduction 
In the literature on credit rating agencies (CRAs) and their role in the current 
financial crisis, three dominant problems are cited as causing the failure of CRAs to 
effectively perform their gatekeeping functions. First, the “issuer pays” system, whereby 
issuers of securities pay fees to CRAs to rate their bonds, creates a classic conflict of 
interest that has led to ratings shopping and arguably affected ratings quality.187 Second, 
there is little to no oversight of CRAs, their methodologies, their symbology (that is, the 
labels they give to their ratings), or their effectiveness.188 Third, there are presently no 
effective means to hold CRAs accountable for their actions through either public or 
private enforcement mechanisms.189 The first and third concerns closely track the 
problems we have just seen with the audit function. The second is unique to CRAs. 
In this Part, we begin by discussing the perverse effects that competition among 
CRAs had in the 2000s. We then discuss the proposal—adopted by Dodd–Frank—that 
CRAs disclose more about their ratings process. Finally, we explore the mix of additional 
ex ante and ex post reforms that would be needed to more fully address the problems with 
credit ratings and use the insights of this analysis to assess the new legislation. 
2. Ratings Shopping and the Debate Whether to End “Issuer Pays” 
Prior to the scandals of the early 2000s and the 2008 financial crisis, the dependence 
of CRAs and other gatekeepers on maintaining a pristine reputation was thought to make 
collusion or miscalculation unlikely.190 Almost no one now holds remotely as optimistic 
a view of the benefits of regulation.191 As Partnoy notes in his assessment of the current 
debacle, CRAs gave high investment grade ratings to 11 big financial institutions that 
later faltered or failed.192 
Many point to the inherent conflict in the inside-out “issuer-pays” model as 
encouraging formalistic compliance with ratings standards rather than serious 
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investigation of risk.193 Pressure to issue a higher-grade rating to a paying customer may 
cause the CRA to willfully ignore the real underlying risks or encourage laxity in 
performing their auditing function.194 Competition among a small number of repeat 
participants in complex markets like structured finance appears to have made things 
worse, encouraging “competitive laxity” in the principal rating agencies.195 Because the 
issuer can always solicit another rating from a different CRA, the CRA has an incentive 
to overrate to retain the customer and prevent ratings shopping. Because CRAs only 
disclose final ratings actions, the issuer receives no informational penalty on the market 
that might be caused by publicity of the lower rating.196 
Despite the significant problems with the issuer-pays model and wide 
acknowledgment of potential ratings inflation and agency costs it generates, there are 
relatively few calls to completely eliminate it or replace it with an alternative system. 
This may reflect either a lack of imagination in the scholarship or the fact that a purely 
outside approach such as an “investor pays” model, the most obvious alternative, suffers 
from equally serious limitations.197 
The most interesting and well-reasoned argument for a new, purely outside “user 
fee” or “investor pays” model has been made by Jeffrey Manns.198 Under Manns’ 
approach, the SEC would regulate the CRA process through a competitive bidding 
process that would simultaneously mediate potential conflicts of interest arising from the 
investor–CRA relationship and increase competition among CRAs.199 Marco Pagano 
also makes a forceful argument for a return to a user fee model, but he does not sketch 
out a model for doing so.200 
 Interestingly, Senator Al Franken proposed during the Senate debates in spring 
2010 that the SEC rather than the issuer arrange for credit ratings.201 The Franken 
amendment was adopted by the Senate, but essentially dropped from the final 
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legislation.202 As we argue at the end of this part, the Franken proposal would have 
solved the agency problem but would have imposed an impossible burden on an agency 
ill-suited to handle it. In our view, there is no silver bullet solution to the conflicts of 
interest in the ratings process. Rather than abandoning the issuer pay model, a more 
promising solution is to remove the regulatory imprimatur given the credit ratings and to 
require more disclosure.203 As we shall see, Dodd–Frank includes new rules on each of 
these topics, although their implementation has proven tumultuous. 
3. Ex Ante Approaches (1): Removing the Regulatory Imprimatur 
Partnoy and other scholars have focused—rightly, in our view—on the regulatory 
imprimatur that SEC regulation gives to Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings 
Organization (NRSRO) ratings.204 Starting in the 1970s, regulators increasingly keyed 
broker dealers’ and other financial institutions’ capital requirements to ratings given by 
NRSROs—treating investment grade securities more favorably.205 Regulations requiring 
investments to meet certain ratings grades subsequently expanded into many other areas 
and now apply to many pension funds and other large institutional investors.206 These 
regulations have led to institutionalized reliance on the very small subset of CRAs 
designated as NRSROs: Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch’s bond rating services 
occupy the lion’s share of the market. Many critics argue that pressure from both issuers 
of securities, who need their bonds to meet rating requirements, and investors, who 
depend on their current investments achieving high ratings to comply with regulations, 
have a powerful effect in inflating the ratings NRSROs issue.207 Regulatory dependence 
on credit ratings has led to what Partnoy calls the “Paradox of Credit Ratings”: though 
the quality of credit ratings declined as the NRSROs’ institutional capacities were 
stretched by understaffing, lack of analyst expertise, and increasingly complex conflicts 
of interest, NRSROs experienced phenomenal growth in profitability and size.208 
4. Ex Ante Approaches (2): Enhancing Transparency and Oversight 
Most (although not all) scholars favor increased disclosure from the black box of the 
credit rating agencies’ ratings process, as do we. But general discussion is often vague 
about just what this should entail—as is Dodd–Frank itself. We therefore treat the 
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disclosure issue in some detail, describing the key elements of an effective disclosure 
regimen. 
a. Mandating Disclosure of Rating Agency Actions 
Partnoy argues that CRAs should be forced to disclose to the public all rating agency 
actions, including all initial ratings proposals, downgrades, upgrades, placements on 
watch, and removal of ratings, in addition to unsolicited ratings and subscriber-paid 
ratings.209 Partnoy believes—rightly in our view—that giving this information to the 
market would not only curb ratings shopping, but also allow valuable oversight of 
potential conflicts of interest and outweigh any costs it might impose on the business 
model of CRAs.210 Full disclosure might also save limited CRA resources that might 
otherwise be wasted on ratings shopping.211 In effect, it would create a “pay upfront” 
system whereby it would be difficult for an issuer to solicit a rating and then decide to go 
with another agency’s proposal after shopping around. Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas, 
and Joel Shapiro also argue for a mandatory pay upfront system.212 Though Marco 
Pagano and others worry that mandatory disclosure of all actions would undermine the 
business model of ratings agencies,213 the potential benefits of disclosure in significantly 
reshaping the issuer–CRA relationship seem too great to forgo. 
b. Clarifying Methodology and Symbology 
The seemingly simple letter rating system that most CRAs use conveys little to no 
substantive information about the characteristics of the debt product it is attached to. The 
reasons for this are two-fold. Firstly, CRAs do not publish the information that grounds 
their rating of the company (although it is questionable whether investors would 
independently evaluate this information).214 Secondly, the method of analysis used to 
arrive at the letter rating is withheld as proprietary information by the CRAs, which argue 
that disclosing their methodology would undermine their business model.215 But without 
this information, it is nearly impossible for the market to evaluate the level of due 
diligence, professional competence, and analytical rigor underlying the risk rating given 
by the CRA.216 
Furthermore, because there are no substantive minimum standards of analysis and 
little to no explanation of the methods used to arrive at a rating, there is no way to judge 
which CRAs’ models are more accurate or precise than others.217 In fact, many CRAs 
have been accused of employing outdated methodologies that have failed to adapt to the 
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constantly evolving debt instruments that have been created over the past decade.218 
Critics further assail the professional competence of the analysts and the CRAs, which 
are chronically understaffed and lack important quality controls.219 It may be inferred 
that one of the reasons NRSROs vehemently oppose increased disclosure requirements 
regarding methodologies is exposure of the flimsy and analytically flawed methodologies 
for evaluating these instruments that have contributed to the present recession. 
During the 2008 crisis, lack of transparency in methodologies and symbology served 
to further obfuscate the meaning of the same rating across diverse debt products.220 This 
was especially important. For example, the risks behind a CDO, a municipal bond, and an 
ordinary corporate debt offering are very different, with widely varying levels of 
complexity that might be very hard for investors to appreciate and even harder to evaluate 
independently.221 Yet each of these instruments is rated on the same scale. The 
temptation to take them at face value is clear, and the proportion of credulous investors is 
likely to increase during a boom period while the reputational costs of understating credit 
risk are lowered.222 
c. Removing the Disclosure Exemption 
Lastly, CRAs are not required to disclose the information underlying a ratings 
decision under an exception to the normal requirement of “Regulation Full Disclosure” 
that is imposed on issuers.223 Thus, inside information can be concealed from the market 
though the CRA is aware of it and may use it to evaluate a rating. This invariably creates 
confusion and speculation in the market, which is forced to act without full access to the 
insider information.224 A more disturbing potential effect of this exemption is that it 
increases the incentive for CRAs to conceal information from the public and artificially 
inflate ratings. As we shall see, our analysis strongly supports the decision by the drafters 
of Dodd–Frank to remove the exemption.225 
5. Ex Post Enforcement Proposals and Comprehensive Reform 
The previous discussion has focused on what may be done ex ante to ameliorate 
CRA conflicts of interest, ratings shopping, and the general lack of disclosure and 
transparency. Many of these problems could also be mitigated if, ex post, CRAs were 
held accountable through public enforcement, a private litigation mechanism, or even 
sanctions built into the structure of the issuer–CRA relationship. The leading proposals 
offer a mix of ex ante and ex post approaches to these problems and range from 
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gradualist regulatory reform to complete restructuring of the ratings market. We assess 
several of the most important below. 
Jeff LaFrance proposes subverting the special NRSRO status and regulatory system 
by creating a competition for NRSRO designation.226 Under his system, NRSRO 
designation, and the oligopolistic benefits attached to it, would be based on the 
performance and ratings accuracy of the agency.227 If NRSRO statuses were put up for 
grabs every three years, LaFrance argues, the incredible profit potential of being a 
NRSRO versus the costs of losing that status would encourage a race to the top.228 
LaFrance’s proposal would preserve the pre-Dodd–Frank regulatory reliance on credit 
ratings.229 Although the proposal is intriguing, removing the regulatory imprimatur and 
enhancing disclosure as Dodd–Frank instructs, seems simpler, less disruptive, and at least 
as likely to function effectively. 
At the other end of the reform spectrum, Manns suggests a complete restructuring of 
the model under which CRAs operate. Under his approach, discussed above, the issuer 
pays model would be supplanted by a user fee system financed by a flat transaction tax 
on all debt offerings.230 The SEC would play a coordinating role and would require 
CRAs to bid for the right to rate a particular debt issue, thus creating competition among 
CRAs and hopefully breaking up the oligopoly the three largest NRSROs currently 
maintain and increasing quality.231 Manns would also end the relative immunity from 
liability CRAs currently enjoy by allowing creditors who pay the transaction fee to sue 
for gross negligence.232 Importantly, enforcement of the right would be initiated by the 
agency and awards would be capped at an undetermined multiple of the fee paid to the 
rating agency. 
While Manns’ model, with its mixture of ex ante and ex post reform, is appealing, it 
also has the potential to become an unwieldy, costly, and politically-charged 
bureaucracy.233 A new regulatory authority, especially one with enforcement duties, 
should be as insulated from political pressures as possible, and be able to attract highly 
specialized experts, which are qualities that are not current features of the SEC.234 
Additionally, Manns’ model does not link the competition for user fees to accuracy, but 
instead offers them to the lowest bidder. While increasing competition, this could also 
lead to a race to the bottom, especially if enforcement were not vigorous. 
A final proposal, by Yair Listokin and Benjamin Taibleson, advocates an innovative 
mechanism that would avoid many of the regulatory costs inherent in other models, but 
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also change both the ex ante and ex post incentives of CRAs. Listokin and Taibleson 
would maintain the issuer pays system that is currently in place. But they would replace 
the current cash compensation system with an incentive compensation system whereby 
CRAs would be paid in the debt they rate.235 
The obvious concerns with this approach are that the CRA might game the system 
by overrating or underrating the debt in question. Listokin and Taibleson argue that 
underrating is unlikely to be a problem, because CRAs that consistently underrated so 
that they would be in effect overpaid would probably not find a lot of issuers to accept 
their ratings proposals.236 In theory, overrating also should not be a problem, since the 
CRA would be penalized because the debt they received would be worth less than the 
cash it replaced.237 But it is possible that a CRA might overrate, despite the lower fee, in 
order to attract repeat business from issuers. 
An additional problem with the Listokin and Taibleson proposal, and also with 
LaFrance’s proposal, is the lack of a private liability regime and the potential 
incompatibility of private liability with their proposals. Their proposals depend on the 
economic punishment being sufficiently strong to discourage malfeasance or negligence, 
but there may be many cases at the margins where this would not be true. A robust public 
or private enforcement mechanism might be necessary in a model where ex ante 
incentives are not overpoweringly strong. Nevertheless, the proposal is intriguing, and 
has the virtue of recognizing the inevitability of inside-out governance while 
counteracting the conflict at its heart. 
F. Insights from Italy and the European Union 
In Europe, auditors and credit rating agencies are regulated by two different, though 
coordinated legislators—the single Member States and the European Union. While 
auditing is a competence of each Member State, credit rating agencies are regulated 
primarily at the EU level. In the discussion that follows, we therefore begin at the 
Member State level, with Italy, and then turn to the European Union. 
1. Auditing in Italy 
For decades, the most prominent features of Italian corporate governance were, on 
one hand, the absence of external auditing of corporate financial reporting and, on the 
other, the existence of an internal board of statutory auditors (collegio sindacale238) in 
charge of overseeing “the overall administration of the corporation.”239 Recent reforms 
have placed much more emphasis on the external auditor. We consider each in turn.  
The “traditional” model provides for a “triple-check” system in corporations’ 
process for choosing external auditors.240 That is, in order to choose an external auditor, 
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the auditing firm must be approved not only by the Board of Directors and the Board of 
Auditors, but also by the shareholders. However, this “triple-check” system is ineffective 
in practice. First, the lack of competition in the audit market is such that the significance 
of which auditor a corporation initially chooses does not realistically affect the auditing 
firm’s later work.241 Moreover, most Italian firms have ownership structures with 
controlling shareholders.242 Therefore, the fact that shareholders must approve the choice 
of external auditor serves little purpose beyond the board’s approval of the auditing firm. 
Italian law strictly regulates both the term and the removal of auditing firms: an 
auditing firm may not be engaged for more than nine years (and cannot be renewed for 
three years after that period), cannot perform the audit for more than six years (regardless 
of whether the individual works for the same auditor), and the corporation must justify 
any removal of an auditor to the securities regulator (CONSOB). Additionally, this 
justification may not result from a difference of opinion about the audit process or 
result.243 This regulatory system may be deemed a compromise between CONSOB and 
the market, as the system allows for CONSOB’s supervision of the auditing process 
without requiring that CONSOB itself appoint the external auditors. 
The obvious lesson for the United States from the Italian experience is that there are 
limited options for further audit reform in a world with only four major accounting firms. 
Restrictions such as additional auditor rotation requirements might significantly diminish 
conflicts of interest in a world with numerous auditors. In a world with only four, they 
will be ineffectual. 
2. Credit Rating Agencies in the European Union and Italy 
Like the United States, the European Union has recognized the pivotal role CRAs 
play in allowing investors to make investment and financing decisions. European Union 
efforts to address the CRAs’ role in capital markets date back to less than ten years ago—
that is, in the aftermath of the corporate scandals of the early 2000s.244 In 2002, the 
European Commission instructed the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN), composed of the Economics and Finance Ministers of the 27 Member States, 
to analyze the credit rating industry.245 In late 2003, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution concerning the role and methods of rating agencies,246 following an initial 
report from its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs addressing the potential 
need for legislative action on CRAs.247 
In late 2008, the Commission announced a proposal for a regulation of the European 
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Parliament and of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies, which both the Council and the 
Parliament approved in April 2009. The regulation set forth four main goals: an 
improvement of rating methodologies, an increase in transparency, proper management 
of conflict of interests between the CRA and the issuer, and creation of an effective 
registration and surveillance framework.248 The industry’s high level of concentration 
also caused the European Parliament to have antitrust concerns.249 Marla Costanza 
Barducci and Timo Fest note that the purposes in the Commission’s proposal correspond 
to the U.S. CRA Reform Act goals: (i) to establish competition among the credit rating 
agencies; (ii) to increase transparency; and (iii) to prevent and/or address conflicts of 
interest between the issuer and the CRAs.250 
The E.C. Regulations’ second goal, transparency in both methodology and 
performance, is of particular note. The main benefit of transparency is the opportunity to 
compare ratings issued by different agencies. Articles 7(1) and 9(1) of the E.C. 
Regulation mandate that CRAs disclose to the public the methodologies, models, and key 
rating assumptions that they used, and also every material change made thereto.251 
Moreover—this feature differentiates the E.C. Regulation from the pre-Dodd–Frank U.S. 
legal framework—Article 8 addresses unsolicited ratings.252 Its goal is to enable 
investors to sort out solicited ratings from unsolicited ones.253 Thus, Article 8 requires 
that CRAs not only identify such ratings and disclose all procedures regarding them, but 
also highlight that the rated entity did not participate in the rating process and, therefore, 
that the CRA did not have access to its documents. This action causes issuers to lose their 
incentive to ask for a “clarifying” rating, which means that investors will demand a 
solicited rating from their chosen agencies.254 Banning unsolicited ratings will implicitly 
cause an increase in competition within the CRA industry—the third goal of the E.C. 
Regulation. 
These developments in the European Union, which pre-dated Dodd–Frank, suggest a 
convergence in the general strategies for regulating credit rating agencies. Both in the 
United States and in Europe, increased disclosure is the principal mechanism for 
discouraging the race to the bottom that infected credit ratings during the real estate 
boom. Rather than an abandonment of the inside-out model, increased disclosure along 
with adoption in the United States of the European tendency to place much less reliance 
on credit rating agencies will become the principal approaches for regulating credit rating 
agencies on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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G. Where Are We After Dodd–Frank? 
1. Directions for Further Audit Reform? 
The current regulatory climate is not a hospitable one for innovations such as 
contractual adjustments to the liability of auditors, at least in the United States. 
Interestingly, some of the more radical reform proposals might merit serious 
consideration in a country like Italy which lacks effective ex post enforcement due to a 
weak court system and the absence of a robust derivative litigation device.255 In the 
Italian context, for instance, the costs of implementing a system similar to those proposed 
by Ronen and Cunningham may be cost justified. 
2. Credit Rating Reform 
Unlike with auditing, credit rating agencies and the breakdown of the credit rating 
process feature prominently in Dodd–Frank. According to an initial list of “congressional 
findings,” credit rating agencies “play a critical ‘gatekeeper’ role in the debt market that 
is functionally similar to that of securities analysts . . . and auditors;” they performed 
badly prior to the crisis, and their conflicts of interest need to be policed.256 To better 
watch these watchers, the legislation instructs the SEC to establish a new Office of Credit 
Ratings,257 and alters their regulation in four ways, several of which parallel the 
proposals we have made. 
Most importantly, Dodd–Frank removes many of the statutory provisions that steer 
financial institutions and institutional investors towards rated securities, and also instructs 
the financial regulators to remove any references in their rules to reliance on rating 
agencies.258 In place of references to investment grade securities, Dodd–Frank substitutes 
language requiring that a security “meet standards of credit-worthiness” established by 
the relevant regulator.259 If regulators fully comply with these instructions, it will bring a 
significant and beneficial shift, given that pressure from the “buy-side” was at least as 
important a factor in the breakdown of credit ratings as the inherent conflict of interest 
when the issuer pays for its securities to be rated. 
Second, as noted earlier, the new legislation revamps the internal governance of 
credit rating agencies, requiring that more than one-half of the directors be independent 
and that some of the directors be “ratings users.”260 The new regulations also prohibit 
credit rating agencies from basing the compensation of their executives on the 
performance or profitability of the CRA.261 These changes are more problematic. Not 
only do they micromanage CRA governance, but they impose burdens on SEC-approved 
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CRAs that non-approved agencies are not forced to bear. 
Third, the legislation seeks to increase the efficacy of ex post litigation by explicitly 
subjecting the CRAs to the same treatment under the securities fraud provisions of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 as securities analysts and auditors.262 It is not 
altogether clear how much effect these provisions will have, since a principal defense the 
CRAs have used in litigation is that their ratings are entitled to First Amendment 
protection.263 The adjustments to the securities laws at least open the possibility of more 
serious scrutiny, although a brouhaha that developed almost as soon as Dodd–Frank was 
enacted suggests that the CRAs will staunchly resist any increase in exposure. In 
response to a provision in Dodd–Frank that created the possibility that CRAs will be 
deemed experts and exposed to potential liability under the Securities Act of 1933 if they 
are listed in a registration statement, the leading CRAs refused to allow issuers to include 
them as experts in connection with offerings of asset-backed securities (ABS).264 ABSs 
theoretically cannot be issued without the CRA rating. Faced with this impasse, the SEC 
quickly blinked, temporarily permitting ABS issuers to omit the expert from their SEC 
registration statement.265 This assures that CRAs are once again insulated from liability 
unless the SEC shifts course. 
An additional question mark in the new provisions is their treatment of the crucial 
question of disclosure. As we have pointed out, robust disclosure—including disclosure 
of CRAs’ contacts with issuers seeking ratings and of the CRAs’ rating methodologies—
would prevent the competitive race to the bottom that plagued the credit rating agency 
process during the real estate bubble. Dodd–Frank explicitly removes the CRAs’ 
exemption from Regulation FD, and it creates the possibility of much more extensive 
disclosure by instructing the SEC to promulgate regulations for increased disclosure and 
inviting the SEC to develop a form for disclosing the CRAs’ methodologies.266 If the 
SEC does indeed require much more extensive disclosure, the new legislation could 
significantly improve the efficacy of CRAs. The key question is whether the SEC will 
indeed mandate adequate disclosure. It is quite possible that the CRAs will fend off 
meaningful disclosure in the rulemaking process, based on the kinds of arguments we 
saw earlier. They will predictably claim, for instance, that disclosing their methodology 
would compromise their ability to compete with other CRAs. As with many dimensions 
of Dodd–Frank, the regulation will only be as good as the regulators charged with 
implementing it. 
Overall, however, the measured Dodd–Frank approach is more compelling than the 
kind of dramatic shift from the issuer pays model that many scholars have advocated. 
While the conflicts of interest in issuer pays are severe, the alternatives flounder when it 
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comes to implementation. The thought of the SEC trying to assign credit rating agencies 
for every debt issuance that needs one, is not a comforting one. Focusing on the buy-side 
pressures in buying rated securities and preventing ratings shopping through disclosure 
are more plausible and cost effective strategies. Each acknowledges the inevitability of 
inside-out governance, but also addresses the pressures that have exacerbated the inherent 
conflict in an issuer pays approach. 
IV. DERIVATIVES REGULATION 
A. Introduction 
As nearly everyone now agrees, derivatives magnified the 2008 financial crisis by, 
among other things, making it easier to speculate on the real estate market and increasing 
the financial fragility of investment banks and other financial institutions. Dodd–Frank 
focuses heavily on systemic risk concerns such as the danger that the failure of a major 
participant in the derivatives markets will create turmoil in the financial markets. At the 
same time, lawmakers sought to exempt corporations’ use of derivatives for hedging 
purposes. In the terms we use in this Article, this suggests, at first glance, that the outside 
dimension of derivatives will be heavily regulated, their use inside the corporation less 
so. But Dodd–Frank requires firms that rely on derivatives for hedging to affirmatively 
opt out of the margin requirements that would otherwise apply, based on a determination 
made by “an appropriate committee” of the board of directors.267 Dodd–Frank has thus 
placed the subject of derivatives on the agenda of boards of directors, intruding into 
internal procedures of corporate governance in order to regulate external market systems. 
As we shall see, this could transform the inside use of derivatives, imposing fiduciary 
obligations that previously had been, at most, confined to a small number of cases.268 As 
with shareholder voting and third party gatekeepers, outside governance is now making 
its way into the corporate board. Before exploring this and other dimensions of the new 
derivatives regulation, we first put derivatives in historical context and critically assess 
the scholarly literature. 
B. History of Derivatives Regulation 
While a detailed historical account of derivatives is not necessary, a brief overview 
will show the nature of derivatives, their role in corporate governance, and the often 
accidental fashion in which regulation has developed. The history is essential to 
understanding the odd regulatory framework that has emerged. 
A “derivative” is a financial contract whose value derives from that of another asset 
or event. Derivatives can be designed or structured in a myriad of different forms to meet 
a wide range of risk-hedging and speculative goals. The most traditional is perhaps the 
forward contract, used for commodities as well as stocks and other underlying assets, in 
which the owner must buy a specific asset on an agreed upon date at a price agreed upon 
at the formation of the contract.269 Futures contracts are similar to forward contracts, but 
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are often standardized and do not expire upon delivery, making them transferable and 
tradable on public exchanges.270 An option contract gives the owner the right to either 
buy or sell an asset at a future date for a specified premium.271 Futures options are a type 
of option contract in which the underlying asset is a futures contract.272 Finally, in a swap 
contract, two counterparties agree to exchange specific cash flows at specified intervals, 
trading one kind of risk for another—for example, a fixed interest rate for a variable 
rate.273 In recent years, the most well-known type of swap has been the Credit Default 
Swap (CDS), an instrument that allows counterparties to hedge against or bet on a debt 
issuer’s bankruptcy, default, or restructuring.274 
1. The Development of Derivatives 
Derivatives date back to at least ancient Sumeria, and they were common in the 
Roman Empire.275 In medieval Holland, forward and options contracts were used to 
hedge against speculative pressures on commodities as occurred with tulips in 1637.276 
As commodities futures trading became more pervasive, exchanges were established to 
facilitate their use, first in northern Europe and then in Chicago in 1848, with the Chicago 
Board of Trade.277 More than a century later, in the 1970s, the collapse of the gold 
standard of the Bretton Woods System and shocks in commodities prices following the 
Yom Kippur War created new risks in the global financial system.278 Swaps, beginning 
with foreign-exchange (forex) swaps and currency swaps, were invented to allow market 
participants to hedge against these new risks.279 Swaps saw particularly rapid growth in 
the 1990s and 2000s, especially relatively new types of derivatives based on credit 
instruments.280 It is this most recent growth that made derivatives a central feature of 
contemporary corporate governance. 
2. Derivatives and Regulation in the United States 
Derivatives have a long history in the United States because of its abundance of 
natural commodities. Futures exchanges emerged throughout the country, with New York 
initially possessing the greatest number and variety of exchanges.281 However, Chicago 
increased in importance as America expanded westward in the mid-nineteenth century 
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and eventually overtook New York as the center of American commodities trading.282 
American derivatives contracts were at first limited to those who actually intended to 
deliver the underlying goods. Courts determined the validity of a contract using the so-
called “intent test,” articulated first by the English Court of Common Pleas in Grizewood 
v. Blane, which sought to bar speculation as a form of illegal gaming.283 At the turn of 
the twentieth century, there was widespread popular support for federal regulation to 
check speculation on commodities futures prices. Despite this, Congress failed to pass 
any bills that sought to regulate derivatives,284 and in 1905, the Supreme Court adopted a 
more permissive approach toward derivatives. Under the “serious purpose” test 
announced in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co.,285 futures 
contract participants were required only to demonstrate a serious business purpose for 
entering the contract, rather than actual intent to deliver.286 
In response to the agricultural recession following World War I, and public 
perceptions of derivatives trading as a “gambling hell,” the government took a more 
restrictive approach to derivative contracts.287 First, the Supreme Court returned to the 
view that some futures contracts were forms of wagering activity.288 Second, Congress 
sought to end the trade in options contracts through the Grain Futures Act of 1922 (Grain 
Futures Act).289 The Grain Futures Act had two goals: to protect consumers against so-
called “bucket shop” operations that fleeced unsuspecting investors, and to provide 
regulatory controls to halt the manipulation of commodity prices.290 
The 1930s brought the beginning of modern American securities regulation and a 
new layer of derivatives oversight. In 1936, Congress passed the Commodity Exchange 
Act (CEA) with the hope of curbing commodities speculation—denounced by President 
Roosevelt as a major contributor to the Great Depression.291 The CEA created the 
Commodity Exchange Commission (CEC) and began active federal policing of the 
market with the twin motives of protecting traders and preventing the systemic risk from 
speculation.292 Its particular target was speculators who had, in the two years since the 
passage of the Exchange Act, transferred their activities from stock markets to grain 
exchanges to escape regulations.293 However, competition between the agricultural and 
banking committees in Congress prevented the creation of a comprehensive, unified 
regulator for commodities and securities.294 
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After a disruption due to World War II, futures trading resumed under the 1936 
framework (although the CEA was subsequently amended in 1968 to provide increased 
power to the CEC).295 America’s withdrawal from the gold standard and the volatility of 
commodity (especially oil) prices after the Yom Kippur War sparked the creation of new 
types of derivatives, and in response Congress passed the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission Act.296 The Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act consolidated 
powers previously shared among state, federal, and industry regulators into a new 
commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), that had the power to 
regulate all goods, articles, services, rights, and interests in which there was a contract for 
future delivery (except onions).297 
In the years that followed, the growing importance of derivative contracts to the 
financial services industry led the SEC to demand an increasing role in derivatives 
regulation.298 In 1982, the CFTC granted the SEC jurisdiction over options on stocks and 
stock indices, while retaining jurisdiction over futures and options on futures.299 Despite 
this surrender of authority, the CFTC found itself quite busy throughout the 1980s as the 
emergence of new derivative instruments, such as swaps and off-exchange futures 
contracts, demanded a federal regulatory response.300 The CFTC took a laissez-faire 
approach to these new so-called hybrid instruments, issuing “no action” letters on a wide 
array of new derivatives contracts and creating a safe harbor for qualified swap 
transactions that put such transactions beyond the requirements of the CEA.301 
In 1992, Congress attempted to tackle the growing internationalization of derivatives 
contracts, which left many outside of the scope of American regulatory power, with the 
Futures Trading Practices Act.302 The Futures Trading Practices Act303 further amended 
the CEA, permitting exemptions for transactions that met a list of vague and permissive 
criteria.304 
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) was the final attempt 
to rethink the regulation of derivatives prior to Dodd–Frank.305 The CFMA excluded a 
broad range of derivative transactions, including swap agreements, mortgages, hybrid 
instruments, and over-the-counter derivatives from the jurisdiction of both the CFTC and 
the SEC, leaving them unregulated by the federal government.306 Under the CFMA, 
certain classes of trading facilities were also excluded from CFTC regulation.307 The 
rationale for this deregulation was that markets would regulate themselves; proponents 
believed that exchange facilities and industry self-regulation would take the place of 
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government regulators, who had, in any event, steadily receded from their role.308 The 
placing of credit derivatives outside of the scope of regulation was followed by the 
loosening of net capital rules for large investment banks in 2004, providing increased 
liquidity that was partially funneled into the growing market for credit derivatives.309 
3. Inside-Out Corporate Governance and Derivatives 
As financial derivatives have grown in importance, they have become an 
increasingly important feature of internal corporate governance. To the extent that firms 
rely on derivatives as part of an overall risk-management strategy, that choice is 
tantamount to allowing the market to serve a risk-control function traditionally delegated 
to corporate governance mechanisms.310 As Frank Easterbrook pointed out nearly a 
decade ago, proper use of financial derivatives can replace some of the functions of 
corporate governance.311 Derivatives also now feature prominently in outside 
governance. Investors can use derivatives to customize their investments, for instance, as 
Easterbrook also pointed out, and try to control for risks that they believe firm 
management will not adequately address.312 They also play an important role in outside 
governance (particularly with swaps) by providing market signals concerning the 
financial condition of a corporation or its securities.313 
Some commentators have suggested that the use of derivatives will be incorporated 
into directors’ core fiduciary duties.314 Although a few courts have suggested that 
directors may indeed have an affirmative duty to hedge the company’s risks in some 
contexts,315 it seems unlikely that courts will actively police directors’ use of derivatives, 
given their deferential stance toward ordinary directorial decision making under the 
business judgment rule.316 Even absent serious judicial scrutiny, however, oversight of a 
firm’s use of derivatives for hedging, and in some cases speculative purposes, has 
become an important directorial function (a function that Dodd–Frank has strongly 
reinforced, as discussed below). Indeed, several scholars have recently suggested that 
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derivatives expertise is an important benefit of private equity fund control or influence 
over a company’s board of directors.317 
Both Dodd–Frank and regulators have attempted to carve out a space for the inside 
governance functions of derivatives. Non-financial entities that are hedging only 
commercial risk are exempt from mandatory clearing.318 However, a corporation that is 
subject to the reporting requirements of Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act must elect to 
use the exemption. The election must be made by an “appropriate committee” of the 
board of directors and only after reviewing and approving the decision. The SEC and 
CFTC have proposed rules, Rule 3Cg-1 and Sec. 39.6 respectively, suggesting 
compliance with the election requirement through a specific corporate governance 
procedure: 
For example, a board resolution or an amendment to a board committee’s 
charter could expressly authorize such committee to review and approve 
decisions of the electing person not to clear the swap being reported. In turn, 
such board committee could adopt policies and procedures to review and 
approve decisions not to clear swaps, on a periodic basis or subject to other 
conditions determined to be satisfactory to the board committee.319 
The election is valid, though, only if the corporation is using the non-cleared 
derivatives to hedge or mitigate commercial risk. This potentially creates legal 
uncertainty for the approved transactions. If the board’s belief in its compliance turns out 
to be incorrect, are the non-cleared contracts entered into illegal? If so, have the directors 
possibly failed their “Caremark” duty to provide adequate oversight of firm 
compliance?320 Distinguishing hedging commercial risk from market speculation is a 
difficult issue,321 as discussed below. Thus Dodd–Frank has linked, more tightly than 
ever before, the outside and inside dimensions of derivatives use. 
C. Derivatives Regulation in the Legal Literature 
Financial derivatives catapulted from obscurity into the public consciousness due to 
a series of scandals involving rogue traders and spectacular losses at Procter & Gamble 
and in Orange County in the early to mid-1990s.322 Because of their perceived 
complexity, the youth of the market, and the scale of misfortunes being reported in the 
financial press, “derivatives” quickly took on a negative connotation in the popular press, 
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akin to speculation or even gambling.323 Capturing the ethos, 60 Minutes referred to 
derivatives as “the riskiest securities ever devised.”324 
Congress seemed poised to make a legislative response to the widely publicized 
derivatives losses,325 but many scholars were skeptical of regulation. Roberta Romano 
warned against “poor policy choices” and “regulatory changes [implemented] in crisis 
mode.”326 Others concluded that “additional federal regulation of derivative securities 
would be expensive and counterproductive”327 or unnecessary.328 Although regulators 
and the press raised concerns that the newfound popularity of derivatives, particularly 
OTC derivatives, posed systemic risk,329 most scholars believed that overall systemic 
risk was actually reduced by derivatives’ ability to shift risks to the parties best able to 
bear them.330 In fact, at least one scholar argued that the best way to achieve an efficient, 
“level playing field” regulatory system for derivatives would be to reduce the regulation 
of exchange-traded derivatives rather than increase the regulation of their OTC 
counterparts.331 
Although this sanguine attitude toward the nascent (yet enormous and quickly 
growing) derivatives market was the norm,332 it was not universal. Even before several 
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of the Investment Companies Act (ICA), “proponents of drastic legislation or regulation to curb investment 
companies’ use of OTC derivatives have not demonstrated a pressing need for such action”). 
 329.  See Michael R. Darby, Over-the-Counter Derivatives and Systemic Risk to the Global Financial 
System 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4801, 1994), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4801 (“This is pretty much the core of the systemic risk indictment: Instead of 
being diffuse where risk gets absorbed by much nonfinancial capital, derivatives permit nonfinancial 
corporations to take on riskier fundamental positions, the risk of which is transferred to and concentrated in the 
financial sector.”). 
 330.  Id. at 22 (“Furthermore, the growing size of the market has led to the development of new risk 
management techniques and skills in dealer financial institutions which have had the effect of reducing their 
overall riskiness by managing risks which were previously not actively faced and managed. This general 
reduction of risk in the system has on balance contributed to the overall reduction of systemic risk.”). 
 331.  See William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives: The Need for a 
Comparative Institution Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. 111, 112 (1995) (suggesting the best way to achieve an 
efficient “level playing field”). 
 332.  See Darby, supra note 329, at 6 (describing how “OTC derivatives [had] largely survived skeptical 
scrutiny” and the existence of an “impasse between some regulators’ concerns and the analyses of academics 
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high profile derivatives disasters, Henry T.C. Hu warned of cognitive biases and 
informational deficiencies that “when applied to the OTC derivatives context, [could] 
lead to excessive risk-taking and overinvestment.”333 However, because the same 
informational deficiencies applied equally to regulators, even he favored only 
incremental changes in regulation (a position he maintained after the major losses of 
1994).334 Thomas Hazen and Lynn Stout took more contrarian positions. Hazen 
supported executive and legislative efforts to place responsibility for derivatives 
regulation within a single agency.335 He also advocated an “economic purpose” test to 
separate impermissibly speculative derivatives transactions from those legitimately 
designed to reallocate risk or facilitate price discovery,336 as well as a suitability 
requirement.337 Stout argued that derivatives trading may inherently lower net social 
welfare, even absent a systemic crisis, and proposed (based on precedent in the history of 
gambling regulation) that derivatives contracts be treated as unenforceable.338 
 
and practitioners . . .”). For criticism of the orthodoxy, see Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial 
Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. Rev. 505, 506 (1998) (discussing the entrenched nature of 
neoclassical economic theory in the legal academy and how such “orthodoxy” prevents complete understanding 
of the risks involved in modern financial innovations. “[D]espite the magnitude of the losses resulting from the 
use of some financial innovations, the law and legal scholarship continue to view the process . . . as susceptible 
to a limited range of risk.”). 
 333.  Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1464 (1993). Professor Hu proposed incremental regulatory 
change with regard to the BIS capital adequacy requirements for swaps even earlier. See Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, 
the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 333, 334 (1989) (arguing that as new derivative instruments are developed and shoehorned into the 
Basel/BIS capital adequacy framework, the capital requirements would gradually become disassociated from 
the actual risks presented by the types of assets in each category).  
 334.  See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: “Derivative Reality” and the Law and Finance of the 
Corporate Objective, 21 J. CORP. L. 3, 10–11 (1995) (“Concerns over the destabilizing effects of drastic 
solutions are particularly persuasive. Departures from incrementalism should only be considered when the 
existing paradigm is fundamentally flawed and a plausible alternative is available.”). Despite the cautious nature 
of Professor Hu’s approach to derivatives regulation, it nevertheless drew sharp criticism. See, e.g., Macey, 
supra note 328, at 85–89 (“Professor Hu does not suggest, much less offer, a scintilla of evidence for the 
proposition that derivatives activity presents more serious problems of cognitive bias, or inappropriability, or 
agency costs, than other realms of human activity, such as, say, wine-making or automobile manufacturing.”).  
 335.  See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?—Derivative Securities and 
Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 1029 (1992) 
(explaining that “turf battles” between the SEC and the CFTC stymie regulatory efforts to the present day); 
Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of the Securities and Derivatives Regulation in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 356–74 (2003) (describing 
regulatory competition between the CFTC and the SEC from the 1970s through the early 2000s); Willa E. 
Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory 
Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 388–93 (1999) (explaining the origin of the 
dispute between the CFTC and the SEC through the 1990s). 
 336.  Hazen, supra note 335, at 1029–31 (explaining the rationale and utilization of an economics purpose 
test). 
 337.  Id. at 1031–36. Contra Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine is 
Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 527 (1998) (arguing that derivatives contracts 
should be enforceable). 
 338.  See Lynn Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of Uncertainty Can 
Increase Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53, 53 (1995) (arguing against the 
efficiency of derivatives); Lynn Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and 
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Three areas generated much of the discussion prior to the recent crisis: proposals for 
margin requirements/capital adequacy, discussions of the application of insurance 
regulation to derivatives, and more recently, the effect of derivatives-enabled hedging on 
corporate votes. We consider each in turn. 
The first issue was the use of margin and capital requirements to curb the risk of 
derivatives. OTC derivatives by definition were not traded on any exchange, and were 
not subject to the margin rules imposed by the Federal Reserve Board.339 Although the 
CFMA restricted OTC derivatives to “eligible contract participants,” including 
institutions and high net worth individuals,340 there were no further restrictions based on 
risk exposure.341 Exchange-traded derivatives, such as security futures, were subject to 
margin requirements, though the precise level at which they should be set was 
contested.342 The weakness of these requirements was the focus of some commentators 
before the crisis.343 This is the one scholarly concern that became a dominant theme of 
the new regulatory framework. 
Second, derivatives’ role in hedging and redistributing risk led some scholars to 
compare the regulatory environment surrounding them to insurance. Hazen questioned 
the disparity between the relatively heavy regulation of insurance products and providers 
and the light or nonexistent regulation of derivatives, which often serve a similar 
purpose.344 Perhaps the most important regulatory distinction between insurance 
contracts and derivatives is that entering into an insurance contract requires the insured to 
have an “insurable interest” in the subject of the contract,345 whereas no such 
 
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995) (arguing that “[t]rading in derivatives under conditions of 
uncertainty may harm trader welfare . . .”); Lynn Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and 
Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 701 (1999) (expanding on her theory of 
speculation and applying it to the CFTC’s proposed regulation of the derivatives market in 1998–1999). 
 339.  See Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, 
Derivatives Regulation, Gambling and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 429 (2005) (“[T]he 
over-the-counter derivatives markets do not impose margin requirements.”). Note, however, that private 
mechanisms for collateral roughly equivalent to margin are not unusual in the OTC derivatives world, in 
addition to the Master Agreement used by most OTC derivatives market participants. PARTNOY, supra note 
322, at 217. ISDA has also created a standard-form Credit Support Annex. See Norman Menachem Feder, 
Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 745–46 (2002) (explaining the 
standard-form created by the ISDA). 
 340.  See 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(12) (2009) (restricting the OTC to eligible participants); Hazen, supra note 339, at 
429 n.240. 
 341.  See Hazen, supra note 339, at 429 (explaining that there are no further requirements). 
 342.  Many commentators put their faith in clearinghouses as the solution. See, e.g., Aaron Unterman, 
Innovative Destruction—Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. 53, 94–95 (2009) (reporting on recent efforts to reduce risk through the use of clearinghouses). We discuss 
clearinghouses below. 
 343.  Partnoy proposed that the margin framework be replaced with “generalized standards” for three broad 
categories of transactions and portfolios, with some categories requiring substantially more than the 20% 
margins proposed by the SEC and CFTC, and other categories requiring less. PARTNOY, supra note 322, at 
230–35.  
 344.  See Hazen, supra note 339, at 430–34 (questioning the disparity between heavy regulations of 
insurance products and the light regulation of derivatives). 
 345.  See Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time to Regulate Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 131–34 (2009) (explaining the insurable interest requirement). 
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requirement presently exists for derivatives such as credit default swaps.346 A few 
scholars have advocated reforms that would require an “economic purpose” (the 
equivalent of an insurable interest) in derivatives transactions.347 Although media 
coverage often supported this perspective—calling for bans on “naked CDSs,” for 
instance—the new framework does not take any of these steps.348 
Finally, scholars such as Henry Hu and Bernard Black directed attention to the 
effects that derivatives-based hedging can have on corporate voting.349 The features of 
equity-based derivatives that make them so useful for sophisticated risk management 
have the simultaneous effect of “decoupling” a shareholder’s voting stake from their 
economic interest in the welfare of the corporation.350 Hu and Black dubbed this “empty 
voting.”351 Although most scholars proposed remedying empty voting through enhanced 
disclosure alone,352 Sean Martin and Frank Partnoy argued that what they termed 
“encumbered shares” should have much reduced voting power.353 In a subsequent 
analysis, Hu and Black argued for a variety of specific structural changes that would 
mitigate the impact of encumbered shares.354 While empty voting surfaced in several 
dramatic cases that made the rounds of the literature—most prominently, its use by the 
hedge fund Perry Corp in a takeover battle355—it does not appear to be a pervasive 
problem.356 As we shall see, Dodd–Frank focused much more on managing the systemic 
 
 346.  See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 549, 609–11 (2009) (noting that while so-called “naked swaps” are a form of “naked shorting” of 
equity shares, naked shorting is illegal but naked swaps were big business). 
 347.  Id. at 610–11 n.210; see also Hazen, supra note 345, at 133–34 (“Policymakers should consider 
whether the failure of the CDS markets has signaled a need to revitalize the commodities laws’ economic 
purpose requirement.”). 
 348.  See, e.g., FT Reporters, Call for Ban on CDS Speculation, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63a554b0-2be5-11df-8033-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1b55ahCkN.  
 349.  See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) [hereinafter Decoupling I] (analyzing the potential costs and benefits 
of decoupling voting rights from economic ownership); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt 
Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008) [hereinafter 
Decoupling II] (extending theories of decoupling voting rights from economic ownership). 
 350.  See Decoupling II, supra note 349, at 633–40 (describing the effects of “decoupling” voting rights 
from economic interests). 
 351.  Id. 
 352.  See Decoupling I, supra note 349, at 875–86 (outlining proposed remedies for disclosure rules); 
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1021, 1077 (2007) (“For now, we agree with Henry Hu and Bernie Black that not enough is known 
about the extent of empty voting to prescribe anything more than an increase in disclosure of schemes 
generating empty votes.”). 
 353.  See Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775 (2005) (analyzing 
the relationship between corporate voting and shareholder power). 
 354.  See Decoupling II, supra note 349, at 694–721 (outlining proposed reforms to the relationship 
between voting rights and economic interests); Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 129, 157–58 (2009) (summarizing Hu & Black’s proposals). 
 355.  Jesse Eisinger, Icahn Cries Foul at Perry’s No-Risk Play in Takeover Fight, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 
2004, at C1. 
 356.  A new article by Holger Spamann reaches a similar conclusion. Spamann argues that the one context 
where problematic manipulation may occur is in the restructuring of debt in an effort to avoid bankruptcy. See 
Holger Spamann, Derivatives and Corporate Governance: Over-Hedging, Negative Voting, and Counterparty 
Incentives (Jan. 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (proposing regulatory correctives). 
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risk created by derivatives trading, while protecting its corporate governance uses. 
D. Derivatives Regulation in the Finance Literature 
Although the finance literature overlaps with the legal scholarship in many respects, 
it has focused more extensively on the reasons that derivatives have proven to create so 
much risk. The literature tends to attribute derivatives’ contribution to the recent crisis to 
one of three causes: 1) the products themselves, 2) pressures created by regulation, or 3) 
cognitive bias and human error. We take up each in turn. 
1. Product-Centric View 
In one view, the foray into exotic derivatives—instruments that were poorly 
understood by traders and investors alike—triggered the financial collapse. Futures, 
options, and swaps have at least one thing in common: a small original position could 
lead to significantly greater risks.357 As it is inherently difficult to assess the risk of a 
position, for many years, regulators’ efforts were aimed only at improving market 
structure and ensuring that transactions and their settlement were properly documented. 
The two most prominent proposals for addressing these problems were moving OTC 
trading onto exchanges and requiring that derivatives be cleared through clearinghouses. 
Both are central pillars of the new regulatory landscape. 
2. Legislatively Driven Collapse 
Scholars who attribute the crisis in the derivatives sector to legislation trace 
detrimental regulatory change to the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA),358 which (in 
addition to largely abolishing the Glass–Steagall Act) failed to regulate and in some cases 
precluded regulation of the hybrid products that newly-formed entities could now create, 
own, package, and sell.359 Products like black box collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
and CDSs fell between the cracks of functional regulation. The GLBA explicitly 
exempted security-based swap agreements from regulation by the SEC by Section 2A of 
the Securities Act of 1933 and similarly Section 3A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.360 
 
 357.  A. Suetin, Causes of the Current Financial Crisis, 52 PROBS. OF ECON. TRANSITION 44–58 (2009). 
 358.  Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 359.  The GLBA repealed portions of the Glass–Steagall Act, allowing banks, brokerages, and insurance 
companies to merge. Thereafter, “financial institutions” were defined as “companies that offer financial 
products or services to individuals like loans, financial or investment advice or insurance.” See Don Pitti, New 
Regulation Will Drive Trends in the Financial Services Industry—Again, 29 REV. BUS. 2, 4–7 (2009). 
 360.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (2009) (defining relevant securities terms). See also id. § 78c(a) (same).  
1. The definition of “security” in § 77b(a)(1) of this title does not include any security-based swap 
agreement (as defined in Section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [15 USCS § 78c note]). 
2. The Commission is prohibited from registering, or requiring, recommending, or suggesting, the 
registration under this sub-chapter of any security-based swap agreement . . .  
3. The Commission is prohibited from— 
(A) promulgating, interpreting, or enforcing rules; or— 
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A number of regulatory anomalies spurred the growth of derivative products, 
notably capital requirements that favored excessive risk-taking. Some pundits wish to 
blame the financial crisis on a general atmosphere of deregulation and free-market 
ideology, but they usually avoid citing specific policies. The most powerful regulatory 
impetus—the anomaly in risk-based capital standards—was subtle and cannot be 
attributed to any particular regulatory ideology. As early as 2001, the Securities Industry 
Association (SIA) suggested, in comments on the then proposed amendments to the risk-
based capital standards of the Board of Governors Federal Reserve System, that OTC 
derivatives dealers should be treated like traditional broker-dealers for risk weighting 
purposes, which would relax standards to a 20% risk weight.361 The result of the back-
and-forth between regulators and the industry was continued commitment to refining 
risk-capital standards to better access risk while relaxing valuation standards attached to 
credit derivatives guarantees and other instruments with risk-reducing effects.362 
3. Human Error and the Role of Secondary Actors 
Scholars who focus on human error emphasize that the realization of risk 
management benefits depends on how market participants use these instruments. They 
argue that a key cause of the crisis and its propagation was the misuse of credit 
derivatives, rather than instrument-inherent features.363 
One possible failure exists in the basic financial model prototype. On this view, firm 
managers’ misuse of derivatives contributed to the current financial meltdown.364 In the 
instance of credit derivatives, most experts believe that a portfolio of simple CDS 
contracts held by a solid insurance company would have survived the recession on an 
equity basis, as the actuaries and statisticians had predicted.365 What the actuaries failed 
to account for—the risk of a broad market decline and the risk of a bond-rating hit to the 
insurer from rating companies—caused risk to balloon unnoticed.366 This created the 
equivalent of a “run” on the insurers’ reserves, as would happen if suddenly an epidemic 
 
(B) issuing orders of general applicability; 
As prophylactic measures against fraud, manipulation, or insider trading with respect to any 
security-based swap agreement . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 77b-1(b). 
 361.  Letter from Cheryl M. Kallem, Chair of Capital Committee, SIA, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Jan. 29, 2001), available at http://www.sifma.org/ 
issues/item.aspx?id=1183. OTC derivative dealers are subject to special requirements and regulatory treatment 
under the rules of the SEC. OTC derivatives are subject to many heightened regulatory requirements. They are 
subject to special limitations on the scope of their activities (Exchange Rule 15a-1), specified internal risk 
management control systems (Rule 15c3-3), recordkeeping obligations (Rule 17a-3(a)(10)), reporting 
responsibilities (Rule 17a-12), and net capital treatment (Rule 15c3-(a)(5)). In light of these enhanced 
regulatory requirements, the SIA presumed that OTC derivatives dealers should receive a 20% risk weight.  
 362.  See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework—Basel II, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 69,288, 69,291 (Dec. 7, 2007) (stating the framework’s intent to produce risk sensitive capital 
requirements). 
 363.  Rym Ayadi & Patrick Behr, On the Necessity to Regulate Credit Derivatives Markets, 10 J. BANKING 
REG. 3, 179–201 (2009); Raphael Hodgson, The Birth of the Swap, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 3, 32–35 (2009). 
 364.  John R. Segerstrom, Are Financial Models Really to Blame, 22 BANK ACCT. & FIN. 5, 39–42 (2009).  
 365.  Id. 
 366.  Id. 
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struck a life insurance company’s insured population.367 Scholars admonish banks and 
brokerages for assuming that the current conditions would continue without major 
disruption.368 
E. The Dodd–Frank Reforms 
The primary focus of the new legislation is reducing the sort of systemic risk now 
considered to lie at the root of the current financial crisis. The reform uses several 
mechanisms to accomplish this goal. First, Dodd–Frank will require many market 
participants to clear their OTC transactions through a Central Clearing Party (CCP, or 
clearinghouse).369 Second, many derivatives will be directed to exchanges for exchange-
trading.370 “Major Swap Participants” dealing in OTC instruments that are too complex 
to be cleared must report to a third-party “swap repository.”371 
Finally, the legislation empowered regulators to place limits on the derivatives 
positions any individual market participant held.372 By pushing derivatives to exchanges 
and clearinghouses, Dodd–Frank aims to reduce systemic risk through greater 
standardization of contracts, more active oversight of collateral requirements, and access 
to more trading information.373 
Congress did not regulate derivatives directly. Instead, Dodd–Frank granted 
authority to various existing regulators—primarily the SEC and CFTC—to introduce 
rules through the notice and comment process that will govern the derivatives markets. In 
addition to the SEC and CFTC, banking regulators (including the Federal Reserve) are 
required to coordinate, draft and adopt uniform rules.374 This process is now well 
underway, although regulators immediately fell behind the schedule that Congress set for 
many of the rules. 
1. Exchange-Traded Derivatives 
The drafters of the legislation believed that more transactions should occur on 
exchanges.375 One of the primary assumptions behind this policy was that reducing the 
complexity of the market will reduce systemic risk. Accordingly, Dodd–Frank will 
 
 367.  Id. 
 368.  Id. 
 369.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1678–82 (2010).  
 370.  Id. 
 371.  Id. § 728. 
 372.  See, e.g., id. § 737 (establishing the power of the Commission to regulate derivative holdings). 
 373.  The EU approach has been similar. Based on the results of the de LaRosière Report, which the 
President of the European Commission mandated to give advice for future European financial regulation and 
supervision, the European Commission has adopted a preliminary proposal to reform the EU policy of 
derivative regulation. See DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE 
EU 3 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (calling 
for critical policy changes to reduce systematic risk); COMM’N OF THE EUR. UNION, ENSURING EFFICIENT, 
SAFE, AND SOUND DERIVATIVES MARKETS: FUTURE POLICY ACTIONS (2009), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0563:FIN:EN:PDF.  
 374.  The principal derivatives regulations can be found in Title VII of Dodd–Frank. 
 375.  See, e.g., Dodd–Frank § 723 (authorizing regulators to require that swaps be cleared and traded on an 
exchange).  
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require all financial entities to trade all cleared swaps on an exchange or swap execution 
facility unless they are not listed for trading.376 Non-eligible participants must execute all 
swaps on an exchange.377 Regulators expected that the higher cost of customized, non-
exchange-traded derivatives will lead derivative counterparties to meet their risk-sharing 
needs through standardized instruments available on exchanges. 
The exchange trading requirement is unlikely to dramatically affect either the inside 
or outside governance uses of derivatives. Pricing of exchange traded derivatives may be 
more accurate, which will enhance its use as a mechanism of outside governance. The 
effects for inside governance may be negative, if the requirement makes idiosyncratic 
hedging more costly. On the other hand, more standardized derivatives are likely to be 
cheaper once the regulation is fully in place, because derivatives dealers will no longer be 
able to charge the premium prices they earn for more tailored derivatives. 
2. Clearinghouses 
The legislation assumes that clearing derivatives transactions through a central party 
will limit the riskiness of the derivatives markets—especially the risk of loss from the 
collapse of a major derivatives dealer. Clearinghouses are intended to enforce capital and 
margin requirements, and to compile and provide information on trading to the 
regulators.378 Because the clearinghouses are responsible for the performance of either 
party in the event they default, they will, regulators hope, have strong incentives to verify 
solvency and to enforce margin maintenance requirements throughout the life of the 
contract. 
How well clearinghouses actually protect the market from escalating insolvency 
during a crisis depends on how much collateral they require. Therefore, Dodd–Frank 
requires that clearinghouses have adequate capitalization of their own, with agency 
rulemaking determining the final amount.379 For similar reasons, Dodd–Frank allows a 
party to a derivatives contract to request that the clearinghouse segregate all collateral.380 
Clearinghouses must also meet ethical requirements such as avoiding conflicts of interest 
and obeying antitrust requirements.381 
The corporate governance implications of the clearinghouses will be similar to the 
impact of exchange trading. The principal difference is that the clearinghouses are more 
likely to increase the cost of derivatives for both inside and outside governance, because 
they will increase costs for dealer banks. If the clearinghouses do indeed reduce 
counterparty risk, they will simplify pricing of the derivatives that feature most 
prominently in outside governance. 
 
 
 376.  Id.  
 377.  Id. 
 378.  See, e.g., id. § 725 (requiring the clearing houses have adequate resources and require adequate 
margin).  
 379.  Id. 
 380.  Dodd–Frank § 724. 
 381.  Id. § 726.  
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3. Collateral Requirements 
Dodd–Frank does not provide any specific guidelines as to how much collateral will 
be necessary to enter into and maintain a derivatives contract—once again, the task of 
setting those figures will be delegated to the regulatory agencies.382 Presumably, the 
clearinghouses will develop dynamic formulas for determining minimum amounts of 
collateral for each derivative product. The formulas will likely take into consideration the 
type of party entering into the transaction. For example, a swap dealer might be required 
to provide a different amount or type of collateral than a business whose primary industry 
is not financial services.383 
Dodd–Frank explicitly exempts hedging from the enhanced margin requirements by 
excluding firms that use derivatives solely for hedging from designation as a Major Swap 
Participant.384 The rationale for the exemption is that end users—that is, corporations 
that use derivatives for the purposes of inside governance—do not pose the same 
systemic risk in their use of derivatives as large financial institutions. Regulators have 
already hinted that at least some of these corporations may not be exempt from the capital 
requirements, however. 385 And the costs borne by dealer banks will invariably affect the 
price of derivatives used for hedging. 
4. Position Limits 
The financial regulators are authorized to set absolute limits on the positions that a 
derivatives counterparty can take.386 Regulators also are instructed to set limits on the 
overall use of particular derivatives contracts.387 The latter limits will presumably consist 
of a ceiling on the total number of contracts outstanding for the same underlying asset. 
Lawmakers may have envisioned this as a tool for limiting trading during times of 
abnormally high market volatility. 
5. Disclosure 
Dodd–Frank requires considerably more disclosure from derivative parties, but the 
information will be delivered to the public only in the aggregate. Clearinghouses, 
repositories, and Major Swap Participants must register with the appropriate agencies, so 
 
 382.  Id. § 725. 
 383.  This would echo the commercial end-user exemption that provides carve outs from the clearing and 
exchange requirements for any counterparty that 1) is not a financial entity, 2) is using the swap to hedge 
commercial risk, and 3) notifies the Commission of how it fulfills its financial obligations for non-cleared swap 
transactions. Id. § 723.  
 384.  See, e.g., id. § 721 (excluding hedging from definition of Major Swap Participant). 
 385.  In 2011 congressional testimony, Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo refused to rule out the 
possibility that some large “end users”—that is companies that use derivatives for hedging—may be subject to 
capital requirements with respect to the derivatives they purchase. See, e.g., Ben Protess, Republicans Push for 
Exemptions to Derivatives Rules, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/republicans-push-for-exemptions-to-derivatives-rules/.  
 386.  See, e.g., Dodd–Frank § 737 (granting the CFTC authority to set limits “on the number of positions 
that may be held by any person for the spot month, each other month, and the aggregate number of positions 
that may be held by any person for all months”). 
 387.  Id. (amending further the Commodity Exchange Act to “establish limits . . . on the aggregate number 
or amount of positions in contracts based upon the same underlying commodity”). 
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that regulators can keep track of their reporting of key data.388 Clearinghouses are 
instructed to provide data on swaps, prices, fees, and the size of the market when seeking 
approval to clear a contract.389 The application must include information on the 
counterparty’s ability to manage risks, as well as data on its financial resources.390 
6. Implications for Corporate Governance: A Concluding Note 
There was discussion throughout the legislative debate about seriously punishing the 
speculative use of derivatives, and Dodd–Frank’s much stricter regulatory oversight is 
designed to achieve this indirectly by dampening risk-taking. The problem from the 
perspective of firms that use derivatives for governance purposes is that their access to 
liquid markets for hedges depends on the active participation of speculators in the market. 
Even if firms that use derivatives solely for hedging are exempt from the most intrusive 
regulation, as Dodd–Frank attempts to do,391 their costs will rise as speculation becomes 
more expensive. In terms of the broader perspective of this Article, the point is simply 
that the inside and outside functions of derivatives in corporate governance cannot be 
separated. Here, as with proxy voting and third party gatekeepers, inside and outside 
functions are inextricably linked—a link that is further reinforced by the requirement that 
directors approve a hedging firm’s invocation of the exemption from margin 
requirements. The interconnections cannot realistically be removed; they must be 
managed. With derivatives, this means recognizing and taking into account the fact that 
tightening restrictions on one use of derivatives (speculation) will have immediate and 
potentially detrimental effects on another (hedging by an end user). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Until recently, the inside and outside dimensions of corporate governance could be 
clearly and meaningfully distinguished. Inside governance consisted of the relationship 
among shareholders, directors, and officers within the corporation, while outside 
governance included regulation and the role of markets in disciplining the firm’s decision 
makers. This is no longer the case. Corporate governance is now best seen as inside-out 
in nature, with formerly “outside” gatekeepers and decision makers regularly exercising, 
or being included among, the mechanisms of inside governance. 
The implications of the new inside-out governance are not the same for every 
dimension of corporate governance. With the proxy process, inside-out governance 
became increasingly important after the 1980s, when the managers of target corporations 
began using poison pills and other defenses to thwart outside bidders, and bidders 
responded by using the proxy process. The recent legislative reforms attempt to further 
facilitate inside-out governance, although they favor traditional institutional investors 
over hedge and equity funds. The inside-out dimension of auditing and credit rating 
creates an intractable conflict of interest, because each is paid by the corporation it 
scrutinizes. Although Congress toyed with the possibility of removing conflicts by 
 
 388.  See id. § 731 (explaining the registration requirements for Major Swap Participants). 
 389.  Id. § 725. 
 390.  Id. 
 391.  Dodd–Frank § 721(a)(33). 
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instructing the SEC to assign credit rating responsibilities, the new legislation leaves the 
conflict in place but seeks to alleviate it by reducing the importance of credit ratings. The 
inside and outside governance functions are more distinct with derivatives. Lawmakers 
focused primarily on regulating the outside features of derivatives much more 
aggressively, but they also reinforced the inside-out dimension. With each of these issues, 
we have suggested reforms that would better coordinate the inside and outside functions; 
or, as in the case of auditing and credit rating, further counteract the conflicts. 
In addition to its reshaping of every aspect of corporate governance, inside-out 
governance also has important implications for the allocation of lawmaking authority 
between Congress and the states—Delaware in particular. It has often been noted—with 
alarm by Delaware, and with glee by Delaware’s critics—that the last decade has brought 
an increasing federalization of corporate governance.392 Inside-out governance has 
played an unappreciated part in this trend. Nearly all of the features of outside 
governance have long been regulated by Congress rather than the states—through the 
securities laws, federal regulation of investment advisors, and other legislation. To the 
extent the shift to inside-out governance is permanent—and we believe it is—this 
suggests that Congress will not recede from corporate governance in the coming years. 
The traditional perception that corporate governance is regulated entirely, or even largely, 
by the states, may soon be a thing of the past. 
 
 
 
 392.  One of the first to sound the alarm was Stephen Bainbridge. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping 
Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring 2003, at 26. 
